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This study traces the development of management policy
within the Department of Defense (DoD) from the 194 7 National
Security Act to present. It presents the recommendations of
the major studies and the provisions of the major legisla-
tive initiatives of this period, which affected DoD manage-
ment policy. The effects of this evolving management policy
upon various major, functional, management problems are then
assessed. Finally, this study summarizes the progress made
in the development of management policy by four major DoD
organizations: the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the individual military departments,
and the offices of the Commanders in Chief (CINCS) of the
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During the first half of this century, the U.S. military
establishment experienced two persistent and significant
problems. One was predominantly internal; the other pri-
marily due to external factors.
The former involved difficulties in achieving within the
military establishment a unity of effort among the services.
Lack of cooperation, and in some cases even a failure to
make preparations for possible cooperation, had begun to
surface as a serious problem as early as the turn of the
century.
In the latter case, the problem involved a lack of useful
strategic direction, from higher authority, upon which the
military community could base effective planning. In the
absence of such guidance, each service had opted to chart
its own course, usually independent of the other service,
and very often independent of the nation's vital interests
and goals.
By the mid-1940 's, two factors had materialized that
highlighted the obvious need for some form of corrective action
One stemmed from the growing need for closer cooperation be-
tween the various air, ground and naval forces involved in
joint (as well as combined) tactical operations. The second

emanated from the growing realization that at least for the
forseeable future, the U.S. would be a major world power
with far reaching international responsibilities. Further,
it was realized that the military community would most likely
continue to play a major role in the development and imple-
mentation of U.S. foreign policy. It would be necessary,
under these circumstances, to insure that the forces developed
and maintained to carry out that foreign policy were consistent
with it.
B. THE PURPOSE
The purpose of this thesis is to conduct a review of the
process by which the U.S. defense establishment has evolved
since World War II in its attempts to solve, or at least com-
pensate for, the two major problem areas previously described.
Most of the focus of this paper is directed towards those
changes within the defense establishment, since that is where
most of the corrective action has been attempted. However,
where appropriate, actions which have taken place in other
elements of the Executive branch, as well as the Legislative
branch, of the government have been cited.
It should be recognized, however, that no attempt has
been made to specifically assess the impact of the actions
taken, nor has any attempt been made to identify the need
for additional specific corrective actions.

C. METHODOLOGY
This study is based on extensive research of original
and secondary source materials. The subject matter is con-
ducive to an historic approach, so generally the paper pro-
gresses in a chronological order. The most important studies,
legislative initiatives, and internal reorganizations, which
affected the development of management policy in the Depart-
ment of Defense, are presented. Then, their impact on iden-
tified management problems is assessed. The analysis is not
to be limited to events, however, since the effects of major
individual players and organizational behavior are also
presented.
Each chapter covers a separate era in the development of
management policy within the Department of Defense. The one
immediately following this Introduction discusses the manage-
ment problems, which led to the establishment of the Depart-
ment of Defense in 1947. Chapter III presents the controversy
over unification of the armed services, which followed WWII.
The resulting National Security Act of 1947 and its Amendments
of 1949 are also presented. The next chapter traces the de-
velopment of DoD management policy through the 19 50's. The
recommendations of major studies, and provisions of legisla-
tive acts and reorganizations are provided. Then, their
effects on the major management problems are analyzed. Chapter
V, entitled "The McNamara Years," details the contributions
of Robert S. McNamara to the development of management policy
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in DoD from 1961 until 1969. Chapter VI identifies signifi-
cant studies and legislative efforts from 1970 to present.
Chapter VII provides a brief summary of the evolution of




II. PROBLEMS LEADING TO THE NATIONAL
SECURITY ACT OF 194 7
The management problems, which existed within the defense
establishment prior to the 1947 National Security Act, can
be divided into two classes. The first class of problems
are those which are historic in nature, and can be traced
to the historic roots of the services and governmental tra-
ditions. The second are those problems, which developed from
the crucible of WWII experience. Along with creating this
new class of problmes, the war required the need for new,
more radical solutions to the older ones.
Among the problems of an historic nature are: the habitual
need by the military for wartime reorganization, civilian
control of the military, military control over its functional
parts, and the continued development of budgetary controls.
Each of these was exacerbated by warfare on a scale never be-
fore imagined. For example, each service had experienced a
need for internal reorganization during both the Spanish
American War and WWI . During WWII this need for reorganiza-
tion was extended to joint inter-American operations, requir-
ing the integration of both services; and to allied operations,
requiring the integration of our joint forces with those of
allied nations.
WWII also produced pressures which created a new class
of management problems. Some of the problems resulted from
12

the demand that this war placed on the resources of both the
military and civilian sectors. Great management problems
developed wherever the civilian and military sectors inter-
faced. Control over procurement and the integration of mili-
tary and foreign policy, required the use of innovative manage-
ment techniques and new management organizations. Other
management problems resulted from the creation of new wartime
organizations. The evolution of the JCS throughout the war
is but one example.
Each problematical theme will be developed in an histori-
cal narrative format. Where material differences exist between
the development of a problem within the Army and the develop-
ment within the Navy, both will be presented. Otherwise,
the problematic theme will be developed within the context
of that service, which is more illustrative of the management
problem under consideration.
A. PRIOR TO WORLD WAR II
Several major problems were historic in nature and could
be traced through the evolutionary development of the War and
Navy Departments. Historically, each service required a re-
organization for its war effort, especially in the logistics
area. Generally, the Navy's transition appeared to be smoother
than the Army's, during both the Spanish American and WWI.
However, each department was subjected to criticism in the
aftermath of both wars. The logistics problems resulted
13

primarily from a lack of coordination, which was fostered
by the bureau/department system.
Service secretaries had no real control over the mili-
tary departments for which they were the nominal head. Mili-
tary officers in general could remain unresponsive to civilian
control or persuasion because of the insulating effect of
the promotion system. Subsequent change to a merit selection
system did not substantially alter the fact that civilians
had little control over military careers.
The department secretary had little or no control over
his service budget. More than just an evolutionary accident,
this lack of control on the part of the service secretary was
promoted by Congress. Congressional support of the traditional
budgeting process was prompted by classical pork barrel poli-
tics. By encouraging a strong bureau system and by forcing
each bureau to separately apply to Congress for funds, indi-
vidual Congressmen could better direct spending, which would
benefit their own districts.
Historically, any control by the civilian department secre-
tary over the military service chiefs, was predicated upon the
convenience of that control to the service chief. Prior to
the turn of the century, a senior military head of each ser-
vice did not exist. Once each service had a senior military
head, either Chief of Staff or Chief of Naval Operations; the
chief, expecially in time of war, had direct access to the
President. This, combined with his ability to control the
14

information flow to the department secretary, tended to insu-
late the chief from civilian control. Historically, the Navy
Chief and the Navy Secretary shared an adversary relationship,
which could best be described as peaceful coexistence. The
Army Chief and the Secretary of War, on the other hand, shared
a relationship of cooperation for mutual survival. The depart-
ment system in the Army presented its chief with a greater
variety of problems, precipitating a closer secretary-chief
alliance.
The department system in the Army and the bureau system
in the Navy presented each with several internal control
problems. Each department/bureau under separate, strong
leadership became a fiefdom with which to be reckoned, espe-
cially since each had a right of direct access to the Congress.
Implementation of the service chief system near the turn of
the century provided for the position of military head, but
he was given none of the necessary powers to control his ser-
vice. Promotions were still controlled within department/bureau
specialties. Budgetary control remained in the hands of bureau
chiefs with their special relationship to the Congress. Even
during WWI , the Chief of Staff's authority, with respect to
strategy and allied relations, was subordinate to that of
the American Expeditionary Force Commander. Additionally, the
growing air arm controversy further decreased the service
chief's control over the entire Army.
The budget, as a management control system, was under-
developed prior to WWII. The major thrust of legislation to
15

this point had been the gradual shift in responsibility for
budget preparation from the Congress to the President. This
shift came slowly. While strong Presidents had historically
expressed a willingness to assume control of the budgetary
system, Congress guarded its position of controller of the
purse strings jealously.
The earliest budgetary system had the individual execu-
tive agencies submit annual estimates of projected expenses.
These were then assembled in a "Book of Estimates" by the
Secretary of the Treasury and submitted to Congress. The
role of the Secretary of the Treasury was limited to trans-
mission of the estimates of spending and sometimes supplying
estimates of revenue. The President was allowed no direct
budgetary responsibility. For the justification of requests,
the agencies/departments needed only to deal with individual
congressional committees. Some of the stronger Presidents
did exert influence on the system; however, even to the extent
of padding estimates [14:42].
Until the Civil War, the budgeting system was relatively
centralized in the Congress with one committee in each house
controlling both revenue and spending bills. After the war,
specialized appropriations committees began to proliferate
in both houses. The budgetary process became a series of
random events with negotiations for expenditures taking place
between specialized executive departments and equally specialized
appropriations committees. There was no executive review of
16

requests nor Congressional coordination of the budget process.
This situation existed for half of a century because con-
tinued budget surpluses called no attention to it [14:43].
Increased competition between committees for appropria-
tions began to result in deficits in 1904. This caused
pressure from the civilian sector to move to balance spending
with revenues and to establish an effective budget system.
Although Congress was slow to respond, in 1906 it took action
to curb deficiency appropriations. Until that time, depart-
ments habitually would submit low estimates, then request
additional funding later in the year. Congress would even
encourage this action during an election year, quietly grant-
ing the additional request after the election. In 1909 Con-
gress passed an appropriations act, which allowed the Presi-
dent to propose appropriations reductions or revenue increases
in his State of the Union address. He still had no authority,
however, to review budgets, limit or control spending [14:44].
In 1910 a Presidential Commission, established with the
concurrence of Congress, reported that, "effective Presiden-
tial involvement in the formulation of the budget was necessary
to provide needed administrative centralization and political
responsibility in the executive branch." Congress continued
to ignore the results of this report, for fear of erosion of
Congressional control of the purse [14:44].
After WWI the need for debt management provided an impe-
tus for a federal budgetary system with executive control.
17

In 1921 the Budget and Accounting Act gave the President federal
responsibility for preparing a national budget. It estab-
lished the Government Accounting Office (GAO) to aid Con-
gress and the Bureau of the Budget, within the Department of
the Treasury, to aid the President in the preparation of the
budget [14:45]. The President's role as chief budgeteer was
reenforced during the 1920»s and 19 30's with increased recog-
nition of the budget's role in economic stabilization. In
1946, the Employment Act established a federal government
role in economic management and assigned its central position
to the President [14:46].
It is easy to see that, until this point, the struggle
with reference to the budget centered on who was to control
the purse: the Congress or the President. The use of the
budget as a powerful management control technique was as yet
unexplored.
B. PROBLEMS WHICH DEVELOPED DURING WORLD WAR II
Those problems, which existed prior to WWII, were for
the most part exacerbated by the war. Members of the adminis-
tration and each of the services wrestled with these problems
throughout the war period. Additionally, the global propor-
tions of the war and meteoric expansion of technology,
challenged those responsible for defense with many new problems.
With the outbreak of WWII it became clear that the habitual
need for wartime reorganization was the result of the mili-
tary's need to improve its own internal control. The global
18

proportions of this war required a general decentralization
of command authority , both between and within theaters. A
centralized control over the bureau/department functions
was necessary to integrate supply and procurement.
Change to defense management, while propelled by the
war, can best be described in terms of the dominant personali-
ties of the time. Throughout history, crises have been
managed by strong personalities. Changes in organization
for the management of the war effort were primarily for two
purposes: to improve the military's control over its own
resources, and to improve civilian control over the military.
The latter can best be explained by the personality of the
President.
President Roosevelt could tolerate the ultimate control
of the military in the hands of no one other than himself.
The master manipulator of people, he applied his usual tech-
nique for control early in the war. Roosevelt chose strong
individuals to run the various defense organizations. He
increased their powers so that they could control their
organizations more effectively, but was always careful to
balance one against the other. Each was powerful within his
own domain, but the larger domain was always reserved for
Roosevelt.
For example, early in the war, Roosevelt chose Adm. King
as Commander in Chief, United States Fleet. Roosevelt subse-
quently consolidated King's power over the Navy by also making
19

him the Chief of Naval Operations. King now had command
over all operational forces as well as the authority to
coordinate and direct the bureaus. At the same time, however,
Roosevelt strengthened the hand of the Navy Secretary vis-
a-vis King by increasing the size of the former's staff.
Roosevelt placed King under the general direction of the
Secretaary of the Navy [7:137]. Ultimate authority for the
direction of the war effort rested with Roosevelt, however,
for King was made responsible directly to him. Throughout
the war, Roosevelt would take actions to balance the relative
powers of each member of this adversary relationship.
Roosevelt was particularly careful to control the con-
tinual clash between the Navy Department's two dominant per-
sonalities: King and Undersecretary of the Navy Forrestal.
Forrestal was the head of the Office of Procurement and
Material (OP&M) . He was responsible for coordination and
policy direction of the Navy's material program. King's
COMINCH-CNO responsibilities posed a direct threat to Forrestal
because King felt that, as COMINCH, he had authority over the
bureaus, which the CNO had formerly lacked. Consequently,
King would present his material requirements directly to the
bureaus. This separated OP&M from those material programs
that it was supposed to supervise [7:138].
This controversy was rooted in two traditional, conflict-
ing views on the proper organization of the Navy Department.
One held that the Navy be divided into its civilian and
20

military functions, with the head of each reporting to the
Secretary. The other subscribed to the notion of a single
military commander responsible for the entire establishment
[7:138] .
King proposed to close the resulting schism between plan-
ning and distribution by his offices and procurement by
Forrestal's with an official reorganization, placing control
over OP&M under the CNO. Rebuffed by iForrestal and Roosevelt,
King remained undaunted and totally implemented his plan
unofficially. Roosevelt then stepped in and restored the
balance.
The operational side of the Navy should control the
material side in determining kinds of material. The
procurement of this program should then be left to
the procurement side with a minimum of interference
in the way it is done. Operations, quite obviously,
has all it can handle in its own field [7:140].
Since King's persistent attempts to gain control over
procurement had failed, the fissure between strictly military
logistics and procurement remained.
Liaison with the line was in fact a serious weakness
in the logistics system of the Navy during the war.
In practice the CNO presented its requirements to
the bureaus and was hostile to any review of them.
It was not until 1945 that any procedure for a
regular review of requirements was established,
and then it was met with strong opposition from the
military side of the Navy [7:139].
In 1945 President Truman issued an executive order cover-
ing King's office and representing an agreement between
Forrestal and King. The order provided the CNO with Vice
Chiefs for the various bureau functions, permanently combined
21

the functions of COMINCH and CNO into the office of CNO,
and made the CNO responsible to both the President and the
Secretary, vice directly to the President. This strengthened
the CNO so that the military side of the department could
be centralized. Responsibility for logistics was divided
between consumer and producer logistics. Finally , a clear
doctrine existed, which placed civilian executives in direct
charge of the business administration of the department,
including direct control of producer logistics [7:143,144],
The Navy's major organizational changes have been detailed
in the previous section. In summary, internal control of
the Navy was improved along two avenues: Operational con-
trol of combat fleets was decentralized under the authority
of theater commanders. Administrative control, as well as
overall operation of the war effort, was vested in the office
of CNO. This centralized authority represented an attempt
to coordinate the activities of the various bureaus.
Early in WWII, two internal control problems became evi-
dent to the Army High Command: The growing independent
strength of the Air Corps, in relation to the General Staff
and the War Department, detracted from centralized control
of the Army. Also, the internal organization of the Army
General Staff confused lines of authority [7:113].
In 1940 the war plans division of the General Staff,
G-5, was assigned to train the field forces in the United
States. It had already developed in size to a mini-general
22

staff; however, by the end of 1941 it became evident that
the War Department had to be organized to fight a multi-front
war. Another General Headquarters was necessary to direct
troops in the field [7:117].
The solution was proposed in another executive order;
this one issued 28 February 1942. Once again decentraliza-
tion of command authority was the major objective of reorgani-
zation. Centralization of administration was also provided.
Operations of the Army were organized into three major
commands under the Chief of Staff. Each was directed by a
Commanding General. They were the Army General Forces, Army
Air Forces, and the Service of Supply. The Chief of Staff
was given command authority over the entire Army, specifically
the supply bureaus. A direct command relationship was estab-
lished between the President and his Chief of Staff in dealing
with matters of strategy, tactics, and operations. The
executive order recognized the authority of the Secretary of
War in other matters, including prescription of the functions,
duties, and powers of the Army commands and the provisions
for administrative methods and controls [7:115].
It is clear that this reorganization was intended to
explicitly extend and consolidate the Chief of Staff's con-
trol over the Army. It is equally clear, however, that
Roosevelt intended to direct his own war. Ultimate responsi-
bility for strategy, tactics, and operations remained in his
hands. That it was Roosevelt's desire to strengthen the hand
23

of his Chief of Staff is reflected by the fact that, during
formulation, the reorganization "was kept secret in the
General Staff in order to avoid mobilization against it" [7:116]
In order to preserve the balance of power between sub-
ordinates, Roosevelt further directed that, "War Department
staff practices would assure direct civilian involvement with
Army policy despite the formal arrangements: The Undersecre-
tary remains fully responsible for procurement and for dealings
with the War Production Board" [7:116].
The conduct of warfare on the global scope of WWII involved
not only the total efforts of the government and military com-
munity, but also the total resources of the civilian economy.
In fact, the turbulence caused by the administration of
economic mobilization was one of the three major sources of
new problems, which affected the administration of the services
during the war [7:160].
One of the major interfaces between the services and the
civilian economy occurred in the activity of procurement. Hav-
ing been the primary orchestrator of the economy for the pre-
vious decade, Roosevelt was not about to allow the military
to run amuck in this arena during the war. He realized that
military leaders would never fully understand the political
implications of procurement decisions, especially during
a time of war. Roosevelt carefully insured that this
interface between the military and the civilian economic
24

community was under civilian control. Furthermore, the
civilian control, at all times, was required to be respon-
sive to Roosevelt.
The important activity of Navy procurement was under
the cognizance of Forrestal' s Office of Procurement and
Management (OP&M) . Along with Secretary of the Navy
Knox, Forrestal constantly sought means of coordinating
the procurement side of the Navy. In particular, he
pioneered the development of two kinds of administrative
controls: statistics and the legal supervision of con-
tracting [7:146]. This is particularly notable because
it marks the first time that civilian authorities attempted
to "manage" a service department with modern business
methods
.
In one of his first actions as Undersecretary of
the Navy, Forrestal commissioned what became the first
Ebberstadt study. The resulting report stated that,
"Procurement machinery of the Navy Department was de-
signed to work in a peacetime situation, where the plenti-
ful supply of facilities and materials and the small
size of procurement raised no problems of planning or
scheduling. Thorough overhaul of procurement methods is
needed to achieve more precise estimates and more accurate
planning and scheduling" [7:149].
25

Forrestal recognized the need for a totally new
organization within the purview of the Undersecretary.
The establishment of OP&M in January of 1942 had super-
imposed a new, centralized organization upon the old,
decentralized bureaus. OP&M was to coordinate Navy
procurement in the face of what remained the statutory
autonomy of the bureaus. OP&M exacted control over Navy
procurement through supervision of the contracting, sche-
duling, quantitative controls, and through control over
the expediting process and methods [7:156].
The administration sponsored legislation, which allowed
contract negotiation to replace competitive bid contracting
Contract negotiation was already a specialized skill in
private industry, but Forrestal soon discovered that it
was totally unfamiliar to the Navy's JAG community.
Forrestal used the need for skills distinct from the old
bureaus' normal engineering competence, to build his own
organization for control. He recruited OP&M, men whose
skills could fulfill the bureaus* needs for commercial
legal advice in contract negotiations, commercial negotia-
tions, clearance procedures for contracting, and statis-
tical controls [7:179].
Forrestal' s success in control over the procurement
process resulted from the independence of his legal and
business technicians assigned to the bureaus. He prospered
26

from the availability of men for these jobs, who perceived
their tenure as temporary and the career effect of conflict
with bureau chiefs as negligible. The uncommon stress of
the war helped to make their advice acceptable to the
bureaus. Still, Forrestal voiced one reservation, "Could
the same methods succeed in the long run?" [7:157]
The second external condition, which most affected
the administration of the services during the war, was the
rise to eminence of the JCS. The emergence of a corporate
body such as the JCS was logical, given the need for an
agency to coordinate the direction of U.S. military
operations on a global scale [10:2].
The JCS was an outgrowth of the Combined (U.S .-British)
Chiefs of Staff (GSS) , set up a few weeks after the Pearl
Harbor attack. It also evolved from the Joint Army and
Navy Board, which was not suited for wartime coordination
[10:1]
.
The basic duty of the JCS was to provide strategic
advice and direction for the U.S. military effort. It
was also to advise the President with respect to war
plans, strategy, relations with allied nations, manpower
and material needs of the armed forces, and matters of
joint Army-Navy policy [10:3]. In effect, the JCS was
a corporate body of military knowledge, independent of
27

statutory duties, whose function was to aid Roosevelt in
coordinating his war effort. The President dealt directly
with this body with no service secretary intermediaries
[10:4] .
Historically, those Constitutionally charged with civi-
lian control of the military have carefully avoided granting
command over the entire armed forces to one military
officer or an integrated group of officers. Secure in
his power, Roosevelt gave the JCS authorities during the
war, which were later withdrawn from them. The JCS became
responsible for national intelligence collection, research
and development of new weapons, and allocation of munitions
[10:4].
During the war, great pressures existed for integration
of policy in the JCS. One was the continued need to
present a common front to the British and other allies.
"Roosevelt had warned the Joint Chiefs that they ought
to settle their own differences over strategy so that they
would be able to deal with the British effectively in the
staff conferences ahead" [7:161], This was a continuing
problem for the JCS. Continued pressure was also





Despite constant Presidential emphasis and external
pressures for integration of the JCS and a more effective
coordination of policy, great problems plagued the JCS
throughout WWII. There existed far ranging differences
over service roles and missions. Each service was unable
to avoid a concern with justifying its own claims and
utilizing its own capabilities. The individual members
of the JCS could agree on fundamental issues of strategy,
only under extreme pressure. As a result, the JCS
operated on compromise. Decisions, involving inter-
service disputes, were delayed or avoided; and decision
making, in general, was closed to outsiders. Consequently,
JCS action was characterized by an inability to make timely
decisions [7:170],
The third external condition, which most affected
the administration of the services during the war, was
the suddenly pervasive need to closely coordinate foreign
policy with military policy [7:160]. In a time when every
political, foreign policy question had military implica-
tions, this coordination process was ably handled by
Roosevelt. By the close of the war, however, the most
perceptive statesmen had recognized the need for a





Management policy within each service department
had been allowed to develop, during the century preceding
WWII, in an evolutionary manner. Organizations within
the defense establishment were more the result of quick-
fix problem solving, political compromise, and entropy,
rather than an objective attempt to recognize and to log-
ically solve legitimate managerial problems. This evo-
lutionary process tended to ignore broad business princi-
ples, which should have guided the development of
management policy. The principle of having authority
equal responsibility was habitually ignored in the evolu-
tion of service department secretaries. The principle
of establishing a clear, organized chain-of-command was
also consistently abused, both within the military and
among the organizational branches of the federal govern-
ment. Service departments and bureaus were permitted
to be virtually independent of service chiefs. The Con-
gress encouraged service members to circumvent their
Commander in Chief in the budgetary process. In addition
to ignoring these broad business principles, the evolu-
tionary process of solving management problems tended to
ignore even greater political principles such as civilian
control of the military.
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Although there is some evidence of an attempt to
take a business approach to solving management problems
during WWII, evolution again played a more significant
role than should have been permitted. Civilian control
of the military was maintained through the force of a
strong President. An interface between the development
of military policy and the development of foreign policy
was a recognized need; but no formal relationship between
the two was implemented during the war. The JCS was
founded as a corporate body at the beginning of the war,
allowed to evolve throughout the war, yet was never
granted statutory authority during the war. Joint opera-
tions were pursued successfully throughout the war,
yet doctrine, which did evolve from these operations,
was never formalized and accepted across the board by
the services. In face, each service held fundamentally
opposite views on the organizational approach which
should be taken for such operations in the future.
Formal, organizational resolution of the above prob-
lems would have no doubt required a protracted battle
in Congress. Because of their different traditional
organizational experiences and parochial interests, the
Army and the Navy proposals on each of these issues
differed widely. A tacit agreement by all parties existed,
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which accepted these evolutionary, compromise approaches
to solution at least until the war ended. Postwar
reorganization was inevitable, but until then, the stage
was being set for violent disagreement.
Two management problem areas were solved very well
during the war. In each of these cases, institutional
changes were made in an organizational approach to solving
complex problems. The first area was military control
over its own internal functions. In each service, the
now strong service chief was able to overcome the tra-
ditional strength of his service's bureau/department
organization. The other area was that of control over
procurement. Success in this area is particularly nota-
ble because it marks the beginning of a trend to success-
fully utilize established business methods in defense
management. One measure of the success achieved in these
two areas is that they were to be virtually unchanged
in the postwar unification of the services which
followed.
This chapter has provided the historic background
for many of the management problems which would plague
the defense establishment for the next three decades. Four
organizations within the defense establishment would
wrestle with these problems. They were: the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, the JCS , the unified and specified
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command structure, and the individual military department
headquarters. These four organizations would attempt to
resolve these problems first with organizational changes,
then with innovative managerial techniques, and finally
with cycle and process changes.
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III. THE UNIFICATION CONTROVERSY, NATIONAL SECURITY
ACT OF 194 7, AMENDMENTS OF 194 9
From the close of the war until 1947, the uneasy peace,
which had existed between the services over postwar unifi-
cation, erupted into a protracted struggle. The battleground
was in the halls of Congress. Each side used all of its poli-
tical muscle in an attempt to influence the outcome of the
unification controversy.
This chapter will provide a summary of the important
details of the unification controversy, which led to the
National Security Act of 1947. The provisions of the Act
and the subsequent postwar defense experience were the sub-
ject of close scrutiny by the First Hoover Commission on
government reorganization. The Act was subsequently amended
in 1949. A summary of the Hoover Commission findings and
their impact on the 19 79 Amendments will also be presented.
A. THE UNIFICATION CONTROVERSY
The pressures of the war renewed a controversy, which
had flared periodically since the turn of the century: uni-
fication of the armed forces. The problems encountered with
the wartime organizations of the services almost assured a
large scale postwar reorganization. The time was right for
proponents of unification to finally achieve their goal.
Proponents of unification, as well as its detractors,
tended to be split along organizational lines. Even the
34

strong personalities of the time held views which could have
been largely attributed to organizational assimilation. The
principle players in the postwar unification controversy were
organizations: Army, Navy, Army Air Corps, and the Adminis-
tration, which represented civilian control advocates.
The Army, as an organization, tended to favor unification
of the armed services very early in the war. The Chief of
Staff, Gen. Marshall, went on record as early as 1941 favor-
ing some form of unification at a future date. He perceived
a consolidated military staff, whose chief would serve the
President diretly [7:189]. This direct access to the Presi-
dent was important to Marshall, who felt that the Commander
in Chief should receive military advice from professionals,
with a minimum of intermediate civilian interference. By
194 3 the Army had proposed a combined General Staff with
three services under a single Secretary. They even included
in their proposal a separate Air Force.
The impetus behind the Army proposal can be interpreted
as a realistic attempt to minimize their possible loss. The
Army knew that loss of control over the Air Corps was inevi-
table. The Air Corps had already grown very independent.
Its Commander, Gen. Arnold, had sat as an equal on the JCS
since that body's inception. The Army realized, that in the
inevitable postwar scramble for scarce resources, it was the
least glamorous of the three services. Pragmatically, the
Army felt that it would be better off dealing within a unified
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defense establishment as an equal, than with Congress in
direct competition with its rivals [7:194].
The Army Air Corps had championed unification for decades
as its vehicle for independence. In fact, the entire ration-
ale for the Air Corps * argument had been inextricably inter-
twined with unification since the 19 20 's. In its view, inde-
pendence was not assured until achieved. Recognizing its
glamor-image with Congress as the service of the future, the
Air Corps had no reason to fear that unification would inhibit
it. The Air Corps pushed strongly for unification throughout
the war [7:19 6]
.
Contrary to the Army, the Navy was not united in its view.
Although Secretary Knox had reportedly told Secretary of War
Stimson that he favored unification and "a single military
department", Knox died before he could make his views public
[7:191]. His successor, Forrestal, sided with the faction
of the Navy opposed to unification. This faction favored
improving joint military operations as an alternative to uni-
fied operational commands [7:188]. It did not fear competi-
tion from the Air Corps for scarce postwar resources, but
naturally preferred to have the Army as its only rival. Pre-
servation of the status quo would limit Air Corps competition
to an internal Army problem.
Forrestal took control of the Navy just as Congressional
hearings on unification were taking place . The War Department
had gone on record as favoring a single Department of Defense.
Forrestal led the Navy attack on unification with an oblique
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movement designed to buy time to organize a better attack.
He tentatively accepted unification in principle, but argued
forcefully against any major reorganization, while war was
in progress. Forrestal proposed postponement of the hearings
until further study could be made [7:197]
.
The Congressional committee accepted Forrestal* s recom-
mendation and directed that the JCS forward the results of
its Richardson Committee, which was then studying the unifica-
tion problem. The Richardson Committee relied heavily on
extensive interviews of retired and active flag and general
officers in the services. In general, a majority of the
Army and almost half of the Navy officers interviewed favored
unification into a single department, but there was little
agreement on the details of implementing such a policy.
The focus of the Richardson Committee inquiry was on the
political power of a civilian head of a unified military de-
partment, the implications of a unified budget, and the roles
and missions issue with respect to aviation. In its report
to the JCS in April of 194 5, the Richardson Committee recom-
mended a single department of the armed forces. It favored
a civilian secretary as head of the department and a military
head, who would be Chief of Staff to the President. The
Chief of Staff would be Commander of the Armed Forces, but
under the Secretary. The report, however, did not specify
any of the details of this dual relationship. There would be
an Air Force, coequal with the Army and Navy, and an Under-
secretary to direct the business side of the department [7:198,199]
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The final organizational-type group of players in the
controversy were administration officials, who viewed uni-
fication as a vehicle for increased civilian control. They
favored unification for greater efficiency, but focused on
the role that a civilian head would play. In general, they
felt that any right of direct access by a military commander
to the President was a threat to civilian control. Tradi-
tionally, these people had feared the General Staff concept
and opposed a single military leader over all of the armed
forces. Consequently, they had opposed any operational con-
trol for the JCS and favored an arrangement, which placed a
civilian service head over three separate military services.
At this point, Forrestal became the major player for
those opposed to unification. Since President Truman had al-
ready come out on record as favoring the Army proposal,
Forrestal had to orchestrate a careful, thorough, counter-
attack. He wanted Congress to consider all aspects of national
security requirements,
not merely in terms of the fighting fronts, not
only at the immediate points of contact with the
enemy but also in all other fields which are
concerned with national defense - our diplomacy,
our industrial organization, our manpower, our
national resources, our raw materials, needs from
abroad, etc [7:204] .
Forrestal then contracted F. Ebberstadt "to make a study of
postwar defense organization, including not only the military
establishment but other departments as well" [7:204].
Ebberstadt' s final report has been criticized more recently
for fallacious major assumptions and some of its conclusions;
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however, at the time that it was delivered, it was recognized
as "the most thoroughly written study of unification avail-
able" [7:206]. Ebberstadt and Forrestal were impressive and
capable proponents. Although their view and proposals were
not fully adopted in the final legislation, they did succeed
in preventing the Army proposal from prevailing, despite
vigorous support from the President and some members of
Congress
.
When the hearings reopened in October of 194 5, each side,
Army and Navy, had fully developed proposals. The Army rein-
troduced its former proposal, after incorporating findings
from the Richardson Committee [7:204].
Forrestal, armed with the Ebberstadt report, attacked
the Army plan on each of its basic tenets: that consolidation
of the services would provide a gain, that reorganization
could be agreed upon in principle prior to working out the
details, and that the relationship of the military to other
agencies need not be considered [7:205], Forrestal agreed
that coordination of the services was the major problem, but
insisted that it was a larger problem than that for which the
Army plan allowed. It required "a complete realignment of
our governmental organizations to serve our national security
in the light of our new world power and position, our new
international commitments and risks , and the epochal new
scientific discoveries" [7:205].
Forrestal advocated before the committee, the following
Ebberstadt study proposals: The defense establishment should
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be reorganized into three coordinate services, each with a
cabinet rank secretary. Coordination for planning would be
accomplished within a statutory JCS . To improve inter-agency
coordination, a group of committees were recommended: A
National Security Council (NSC) , a Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) , a National Security Resources Board (NSRB) , a
Central Research and Development Agency, and a Military Educa-
tion and Training Board. Forrestal's major thesis was that
military coordination had been good during the war. Coordina-
tion external to the military was what was lacking. The
recommended committees would coordinate foreign with military
policy, strategic planning with logistic feasibility and
implementation, procurement with logistics, and the myriad
of intelligence agencies with each other [7:205].
At the close of these hearings the battle lines were drawn
The Army proposals were on the one side with Presidential sup-
port. On the other side were the Navy's more articulate pro-
posals. These lines were drawn in 194 5, but reorganization
did not appear until 1947. The intervening two years saw
proponents of each side in Congress attempt to muster support
along parochial lines. Hearings in each house, in each of
the standing committees concerned with the issue, were held.
The resulting legislation was a victim of compromise. The
National Security Act of 194 7 was a tentative step in the




B. THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
Congress was very specific in stating the purpose of the
1947 legislation. Its major goal was to provide a compre-
hensive program for the future security of the U.S. by pro-
viding for the establishment of integrated policies and pro-
cedures for the departments, agencies, and functions relating
to national security. It wanted to establish three, coequal
military departments and to provide for their integration
into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces. In
doing so, the intent of Congress was not to merge the depart-
ments, but to provide authoritative coordination and unified
direction under civilian control. Congress also wanted to
ensure effective strategic direction of the armed forces
[27:496]
.
The National Security Council (NSC) was charged with
coordination of national security and given the function of
advising the President with respect to the integration of
domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the
national security. The purpose of this function was to
enable the military departments and other agencies of the
government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving
national security. The NSC was to be composed of the Presi-
dent, Secretary of Defense, the three service secretaries,
chairman of the National Security Resources Board (NSRB)
,





Aside from such duties as directed by the President, the
NSC was specifically tasked by Congress to consider policies
on matters of common interest to departments and agencies
concerned with national security. It was also to "assess
and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the
U.S. in relation to our actual and potential military power"
[27:497].
The 1947 Act also established the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA)
,
provided for the office and duties of its direc-
tor and charged the agency with the coordination of intelli-
gence gathering activities [27:498].
The NSRB was established to advise the President con-
cerning the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian
mobilization. It was to develop policy for the most effective
mobilization in time of war by establishing programs for
effective wartime use of the nation's natural and industrial
resources. It was to establish a policy to ensure adequate
reserves of strategic or critical materials and assist in
the strategic relocation of industries, services, government,
and economic activities. Most importantly, the NSRB was
charged with the maintenance, stabilization and adjustment of
the civilian economy in time of war [27:499].
The Congress created, in the 1947 National Security Act,
a National Military Establishment. It was to be headed by
a cabinet-level, civilian, Secretary of Defense, who was to
serve as the principal assistant to the President on all
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matters relating to national security. Congress was very
careful to ensure that this post be civilian controlled.
Former (retired) military officers would not be eligible for
this post unless they had left the service and had been mem-
bers of the civilian community for at least ten years [27:500]
Some specific duties of the Secretary of Defense were
enumerated in the Act. He was to establish policy and pro-
grams for the National Military Establishment (NME) . The
Secretary could exercise "general" direction , authority, and
control over all departments and agencies within the NME.
He was tasked to eliminate unnecessary duplication within
his department in the fields of procurement, supply, trans-
portation, storage, health, and research. To accomplish
these duties, the Secretary was given the power to supervise
and coordinate the preparation of the budget estimates of
all the departments and agencies within the NME [27:500],
Along with enumerating his specific duties, the Congress
placed specific restrictions on the administrative powers
of the Secretary of Defense. It gave the individual service
secretaries direct access to the President or to the Director
of the Bureau of the Budget with an obligation only to inform
the Secretary of Defense in advance. Individual service de-
partments were to be administered as individual executive
departments by their respective secretaries. The Secretary
of Defense was allowed to use military personnel but was not
permitted to establish a military staff [27:500].
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The National Security Act established three co-equal
military departments, each with its own mission. Each depart-
ment was headed by a civilian secretary assisted by a senior
military officer. The mission for the Department of the Army
was to organize, train, and equip primarily for prompt and
sustained combat incident to operations on land. The Depart-
ment of the Navy was tasked with the same mission "incident
to operations at sea" [27:501]. The Department of the Air
Force mission, naturally, specified operations in the air.
The Department of the Navy was permitted to keep its Marine
Corps and Naval aviation. Naval aviation was to include land-
based naval air, air transport essential for naval operations,
all air weapons, and air techniques involved in the opera-
tions and activities of the Navy. Its mission responsibili-
ties were naval reconnaissance, anti-submarine warfare, and
protection of shipping. The Navy was permitted to develop
aircraft, weapons, tactics, techniques, organizations, and
equipment of its naval combat and service elements. The only
caveat attached was that matters of joint concern be coordinated
between the services [27:502].
The Act separated Army Air Corps units from the Army and
established the Department of the Air Force [27:502]. It
was a separate co-equal service, with its own Secretary and
Chief of Staff. As with the other service departments, the
Air Force Chief of Staff was to exercise command over his
service and was charged with the duty of "carrying into execution
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all lawful orders and directives, which may be transmitted
to him" [27:503] .
To consider "all matters of broad policy" relating to
the armed forces, Congress established the War Council. It
was to be composed of the Secretary of Defense, service secre-
taries, and the service chiefs. Power of decision for the
council was vested in the Secretary of Defense [27:504].
The Act embodied statutory authority for the establish-
ment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to be composed of
the individual service chiefs and "the Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief, if there be one" [27:505]. The JCS were
to be the principal military advisors to the President and to
the Secretary of Defense; and were permitted to establish a
joint staff not to exceed 100 officers [27:505].
Subject to the authority of the President and the Secre-
tary of Defense, the JCS were to perform the following func-
tions: (1) to prepare strategic plans and to provide for
the strategic direction of the armed forces, (2) to prepare
joint logistic plans and assign responsibilities to military
services, (3) to establish unified commands in the interest
of national security, (4) to formulate policy for joint train-
ing and coordinate the education of members of the military
forces, (5) to review the major material and personnel re-
quirements of the military forces [27:505].
In order to coordinate other activities, which interfaced
with military affairs, the Act established the Munitions Board
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and the Research and Development (R&D) Board. The Munitions
Board was placed under the Secretary of Defense and given
the mission to support strategic and logistic plans prepared
by the JCS
.
The R&D Board was to "advise the Secretary of
Defense as to status of scientific research relative to
national security, and assist in assuring adequate provisions
for the same" [27:506].
The National Security Act of 1947 wa|s not successful in
solving the management problems, which existed in the defense
establishment during WWII. This is evidenced by the fact
that the Act received its first major revision just two years
later in 1949. The failures of the Act can be traced to poor
implementation and to the incompleteness of the Act itself.
In general, Congressional resolution of the unification con-
troversy, culminating in the National Security Act of 1947,
was characterized by tentativeness and compromise. The Act
was deliberately vague in establishing relative priority among
the relationships, that it had created. Clear lines of
authority were not delineated and power was not always com-
mensurate with responsibility.
Intelligent criticism of the Act during this period came
from two primary sources: a retiring Secretary of Defense
Forrestal, and the First Hoover Commission Report. Forrestal's
recommendations centered upon strengthening the position of
Secretary of Defense. The Hoover Commission's recommendations
were more broad in nature. They not only focused on specific
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problems within the National Military Establishment, but
also on problems applicable to the administration of govern-
ment in general
.
Changes created by the 1947 National Security Act were
not tested by war before the Act's revision in 1949. For
the most part the services* historic need for wartime reorgani-
zation was resolved by the changes, which took place during
WWII. Most of these changes, it will be remembered, were
internal to each service. They tended to stress decentrali-
zation of operational commands, but centralized the service
chief's control of overall coordination within his service.
Each service chief was given the power to control the opera-
tions of his service's traditionally independent departments
of bureaus
.
According to the Hoover Commission and Forrestal, the
1947 National Security Act failed greatest in its attempt to
enhance civilian control over the military. As the first
Secretary of Defense, Forrestal, naturally called for a broad
clarification of the powers of the Secretary of Defense. He
wanted to create the positions of Undersecretary of Defense
and Chairman of JCS . Forrestal also advocated elimination of
the service secretaries from the NSC and the cabinet [12:234].
The Hoover Commission, headed by a former President, was
predominantly composed of distinguished civilians with broad
government experience. There can be no doubt that their
orientation as a group was toward strong and complete civilian
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control of the military establishment. The Commission's
stand was made clear in the introduction of its remarks on
the National Military Establishment.
The military arm, in its new strength, must be
unequivocably under the direction of the execu-
tive branch and fully accountable to the Presi-
dent, the Congress, and the people. Not only
must we safeguard our democratic traditions
against militarism, but insure that military
policy is in close accord with national needs
and national welfare [12:186].
The Hoover Commission thoroughly reviewed the operations
of the National Military Establishment and cited several dis-
turbing trends. There existed continued disharmony within
the Department and a general lack of unified planning. Most
officials in the Department lacked an understanding of the
effect of huge military costs on the national economy. Inter-
service rivalries were too great; especially in regard to
research and development, the JCS, and the CIA [12:187]. The
conclusion of the Commission was that these disturbing trends
could be attributed to a statutorily emasculated position of
Secretary of Defense.
The lack of central authority in the direction of
the National Military Establishment, the rigid
statutory structure established under the act,
and divided responsibility, have resulted in a
failure to assert clear civilian control over the
armed forces [12:187],
The Hoover Commission went on to cite many specific prob-
lems with the Act, which contributed to the lack of effective
civilian control. The Secretary of Defense was only granted
by the legislation "general" authority over the service
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departments. He could not "hire and fire" subordinates,
except for his direct staff. All appointive power not in
the hands of the President was vested in the individual ser-
vice secretaries. In addition, the Secretary's staff was
inadequate; he had no authority to reorganize, and the service
secretaries had more staff assets for planning and execution.
Perhaps the Secretary's greatest limitation was his inade-
quate powers over budget and expenditures. The service secre-
taries were given explicit authority to resist the supervision
of the Secretary of Defense in budgeting matters by appealing
directly to the President or his Director of the Budget.
Finally, the individual service secretaries were permitted
to sit co-equal with the Secretary of Defense on the highest
policy-making boards, the NSC and Cabinet [12:189].
To resolve the problems created by the weakness of the
National Security Act, the Hoover Commission proposed the
following specific changes and additions: (1) that full
authority and accountability for the "Defense Department" be
centered in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, (2) that
all statutory authority presently vested in the service de-
partments be granted to the Secretary of Defense (the Secre-
tary could then delegate authority as he saw fit) , (3) that
the Secretary of Defense be granted full authority to establish
policies and programs, (4) that individual service secretaries
be denied any right of appeal directly to the President,
(5) that administration of the services be subject to the
full direction and authority of the Secretary of Defense,
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(6) that a Chairman of the JCS be appointed by the Secretary
of Defense, with Presidential consent, to represent and re-
port to the Secretary of Defense, (7) that full and final
authority over both the preparation and the execution of
the military budget be vested in the Secretary of Defense,
(8) that full authority for the procurement and the manage-
ment of supplies be given to the Secretary of Defense, and
(9) that military education, training, recruitment, promo-
tions and transfers among the services be placed under the
central direction of the Secretary of Defense [12:194].
According to the Hoover Commission, the intent of the
1947 legislation was to have policy guidance flow from the
NSC. This had not occurred, stated the Commission, because
both the NSC and JCS had abdicated their responsibilities,
forcing the services to fill the resulting void.
Instead of policy determining strategy, and
strategy in turn determining its military
implementation in terms of size and nature of
the military establishment, the tendency is in
the reverse direction. The unilateral aims and
policies of the military services are combining
to make the strategy they are supposed to serve,
and the strategy is tending to make the national
policy [7:241]
.
The Hoover Commission called for fuller participation of
the NSC in policy making. The Commission warned that NSC
effectiveness was directly related to Presidential support.
It criticized President Truman for his lack of support of
the NSC. After its first meeting, the President had declined
to attend any further deliberations. The fundamental problem
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was a disagreement between the President and the Congress
as to the purpose of the body. The Congress had intended
to create a corporate body, which would utilize consensus
decision-making to formulate broad national security policy.
The President viewed and utilized the NSC as just another
group of cabinet-level advisors.
The Hoover Commission had not been founded to only study
the administration and management of the defense function.
Their mission was to study the entire spectrum of adminis-
tration of government at the federal level. Since the Com-
mission was predominantly made up of business oriented people,
it is not unreasonable to expect that their study concen-
trated on financial management areas. Perhaps the Commis-
sion's stiffest criticism, for the entire government, and
particularly the defense establishment, was directed toward
budgeting and accounting control.
In general, the Commission found that budgeting and
accounting controls were lacking throughout the federal govern-
ment. The Government Corporation Control Act of 1945 had
put incorporated government business enterprises on a sound
financial footing. It required them to have business-type
budgets and accounts, which were to be audited by the GAO
[17:50]. However, the Hoover Commission found that the ab-
sence of accurate and usable cost data was a major defect.




With specific reference to the defense establishment and
budgeting and accounting controls, the Commission stated:
In the period ahead when national security will
demand a large military budget, this time honored
device for subordinating the military to civilian
control (control of purse strings) will be ineffec-
tive. The remedy must be sought through organiza-
tion of the executive branch to establish firm
lines of authority and accountability [12:190],
In addition to those budgetary recommendations that the
Commission had made to improve civilian control over the
military, the Hoover Commission recommended performance
budgeting. The Secretary of Defense would manage a perform-
ance type budgeting system, which emphasized defense objec-
tives and functions. Accounts and the accumulation of costs
would be coexistant with responsibility so that performance
could be monitored. Also the military would be required to
maintain a complete, accurate, inventory system. With these
control devices, Congress, through a single official, could
assure that the budget conformed with national policy [12:191]
The Hoover Commission did not really delve into some other
management problems such as military control within the mili-
tary, control over procurement, or the operations of the JCS
.
These three areas remained relatively unchanged from WWII.
The National Security Act had merely made the JCS a statutory
body. Operations of the JCS remained unchanged. The Hoover
Commission's only recommendation concerned appointing a Chair-
man, as already noted. Neither the 1947 Act nor the Hoover
Commission affected internal military control or procurement.
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In summary, the Hoover Commission felt that,
Recent reorganization efforts have been focused
on improved administration of the armed forces,
but have not attained significant results in
improving their business activities. Changes
(by this Commission) have been designed to
attain unity, to increase civilian control, and
thereby promote economy and efficiency [17:199].
C. NATIONAL SECURITY ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1949
Legislation, enacted in 1949 to revise the National Se-
curity Act, was passed by Congress for the express purpose
of "reorganizing fiscal management in the National Military
Establishment to promote economy and efficiency" [28:578].
The Congress relied heavily on the recommendations of the
Hoover Commission, implementing many of them with little or
no variation.
The National Security Act Amendments of 1949 focused on
improving management within the National Military Establish-
ment by strengthening two traditional management-problem
areas. The Amendments sought to strengthen civilian control
over the military by eliminating former weaknesses in the
Secretary of Defense's position. They also improved manage-
ment control by implementing new budget procedures
.
The Amendments primarily dealt with the relationships sur-
rounding the Office of Secretary of Defense. First, the
Amendments eliminated the individual service departments as
cabinet-level activities. The National Military Establishment
was formally redesignated the Department of Defense (DoD)
.
In doing so, the Congress made the DoD the only military,
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cabinet-level, executive department. The Army, Navy, and
Air Force, were reduced to military departments, vice their
former status as executive departments. Now the individual
service secretaries would no longer be able to rival the
Secretary of Defense as members of the President's cabinet.
The Secretary of Defense's position was further strengthened
by the removal of the individual service secretaries from
the NSC [28:579]
.
The Amendments established the Secretary of Defense as
the principal assistant to the President in all matters re-
lating to DoD. He was given full authority, direction, and
control over the DoD. The individual service departments
were still to be separately administered; but now such admin-
istration was placed under the direction, authority and con-
trol of the Secretary of Defense. Direct access of the ser-
vice secretaries to the President was eliminated. The ser-
vice secretaries and members of the JCS were still permitted,
however, to testify of their own volition to Congress, after
first informing the Secretary of Defense [28:580]. The
staff for the Secretary of Defense was strengthened, granting
him a Deputy, who was to be senior to the service secretaries
Provision was also made for three additional Assistant
Secretaries (see Fig. 1) [28:581].
The Amendments brought both the Munitions and Research
and Development Boards into the DoD and under the full con-
trol of the Department of Defense [28:583,584]. They also





















Figure 1. 19 49 Office of the Secretary of Defense
Defense. The JCS was given a Chairman to be the senior
uniformed military officer of the armed services. He held
no vote in that body's deliberations nor was he to exercise
any command. The Chairman was to preside over the JCS, pro-
viding agenda and bringing issues which could not be resolved
to the attention of the President [28:581].
The second area, with which the Amendments were primarily
concerned, was that of budgeting and financial management.
The Amendments stipulated that one of the new Assistant Secre-
taries be designated Comptroller. He would be responsible to
the Secretary of Defense for the overall financial management
system within the DoD. This reflected a significant new
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capability for the Secretary of Defense. Each individual
service department was to also have a Comptroller, who was
to be responsive to direction from the Comptroller of the
Department of Defense [28:585],
The Amendments instituted a performance budgeting con-
cept "so as to account for, and report the cost of performance
of readily identifiable functional programs and activities,
with segregation of operating and capital programs" [28:587].
Management and working capital funds were established in
order to operate military industrial/commercial type activi-
ties on sound business principles [28:587].
D. SUMMARY
The unification controversy has been presented in a sum-
marized form, emphasizing only those elements of the contro-
versy relevant to the broader topic of development of manage-
ment policy within the Department of Defense. The opposing
views involved in the controversy were rooted in the diver-
gent developments of administration in the War and Navy depart-
ments over the previous century. The controversy raged openly
in Congress for a full two years before legislation was
developed. It should be obvious that one doctrine could not
simultaneously please the divergent interest involved.
The National Security Act of 1947 was a piecemeal approach
to settling the unification controversy. Because it was a
compromise piece of legislation, it was riddled with weakness
and served only as a tentative step in the direction toward
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unification. The NSC was given broad guidance to serve as
the interface between national and military policy; but it
was given little or no authority. Its only legitimate
authority stemmed from the President's membership; but he
was free to choose to ignore the NSC.
The Secretary of Defense was made responsible for a uni-
fied military establishment; however, he was not given
authority which was commensurate with this responsibility.
Exercising only "general" direction, authority, and control,
the Secretary of Defense could be constantly outflanked by
aggressive service secretaries. They were granted membership
to the highest councils, cabinet-level authority, and an
avenue of redress exclusive of the Secretary of Defense.
The 1949 Amendments resolved most of these statutory
limitations to the power of the Secretary of Defense. But
while conferring upon him ultimate de jure control, de facto
control would elude the Office of Secretary of Defense for
years to come. The National Security Act as amended left
untouched some of the other managerial problems, which existed
in the Department of Defense at this time.
One of the highlights of the period was the Hoover Com-
mission Report on governmental operations. It began a trend
toward independent, in-depth study of Defense Department
management problems from a business perspective. Unfortunately,
the Amendments of 1949 demonstrated a trend of ignoring the
results of such studies. The Amendments incorporated many
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parts of the study into the National Security Act, especially
with reference to the Secretary of Defense. However, little
was accomplished toward improving the operations of the
business functions within the Department of Defense.
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IV. DEVELOPMENT DURING THE 1950S
During the decade from 1950 to 1959, two major studies
on the organization of the Department of Defense were con-
ducted: The Rockefeller Committee Report in 1952 and the
Second Hoover Commission Report of 1956. Congress enacted
two major reorganization plans based on these studies. The
decade also saw the enactment of two major pieces of legis-
lation changing the accounting and budgeting systems to be
used by the Department of Defense.
The provisions of each of these events will be presented
in the first part of this chapter. Then the impact of these
provisions on the major managerial problems within the De-
partment of Defense will be discussed.
A. PROVISIONS OF THE BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING PROCEDURES
ACT OF 19 50
In 19 50 the Congress enacted legislation which was to
correct some of the deficiencies cited by the First Hoover
Commission. The express purpose of the Act was "to authorize
the President to determine the form of the national budget
and of departmental estimates, to modernize and simplify
governmental accounting and auditing methods and procedures"
[29:832], Specifically, the President was tasked to develop
programs for improved gathering, compiling, analyzing, pub-
lishing, and disseminating statistical information. Government
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owned corporations were to begin developing annual, business-
type budgets
.
The second part of the legislation, known as the Account-
ing and Auditing Act of 1950, recognized the need for an
internal audit function within the federal government. This
part of the Act began the development of a comprehensive,
coordinated system of accounting controls to improve both
judiciary and management accounting. The Comptroller General,
as an agent of Congress, was given primary responsibility
for auditing [29:834,835].
After consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury
and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Comptroller
General was to prescribe the principles, standards, and re-
quirements for accounting to be observed by each agency. The
prescribed requirements were to integrate accounting sys-
tems throughout the government, promote full disclosure of
financial operations for each executive agency and the govern-
ment as a whole, and provide the financial information neces-
sary for the Congress and the President [29:835].
The General Auditing Office (GAO) , Congress' own auditing
arm, was instructed to aid the executive agencies in the
development of their accounting systems. All accounting sys-
tems so developed had to be submitted to the Comptroller
General for approval . The GAO was to perform the independent
auditing function "on a regular basis," and report to Congress
In its independent audit of each executive, legislative, and
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judicial agency, the GAO was to supplement the principles
and rules, established by the Comptroller General, with
"generally accepted principles of auditing." Its audits
were to consider the effectiveness of accounting organiza-
tions and systems, internal audit and controls, and related
administrative procedures [29:837],
The Act required each executive agency head to develop
an accounting system, which would perform the following:
(1) full disclosure of the financial results of agency
activities, (2) adequate financial information for management
needs, (3) effective control over and accountability for all
funds, property and other assets, including appropriate
internal audit, (4) reliable accounting results to prepare
and support budget requests and controlling and executing
budgets, and (5) suitable systems integration with the Depart-
ment of the Treasury, which was to develop the accounting
controls for the disbursement function [29:836].
B. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ROCKEFELLER COMMITTEE REPORT
ON DOD REORGANIZATION
In 19 52 the Rockefeller Committee was established by
President Eisenhower to study the Department of Defense as
part of the Republican administration's transition to power.
The Committee was to concentrate its attention on the basic
organization and procedures of the DoD, especially with
respect to the Secretary of Defense and his relationship
with his principle civilian and military assistants. The
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Committee's interpretation of its objectives is found in
the introduction to its reommendations
.
The committee believes that the form of organi-
zation recommended in this report will establish
a framework within which the DoD can operate
effectively to attain the broad objectives toward
which the Secretary of Defense and the President
are working—to provide the nation with maximum
security at minimum cost, and without danger
to our free institutions [23:36],
The Rockefeller Committee Report began with an assess-
ment of the National Security Act. The Act, said the Com-
mittee, provided through the Secretary of Defense, a cen-
tral organization for the exercise of direction, authority,
and control over the entire DoD. The Act provided a cen-
tralized structure for the establishment of policies aimed
at assisting the President in carrying out his Commander in
Chief responsibilities. At the same time, it maintained a
decentralized organization for administration through the
three military departments.
The Committee recommended detailed improvements to the
legislation to obtain the following objectives: (1) Estab-
lish clear and unmistakable lines of authority and responsi-
bility had to be developed within the DoD. (2) The Secre-
tary of Defense had to clarify individual service roles and
missions. (3) Force planning had to be based on the most
effective use of our modern scientific and industrial re-
sources. (4) The DoD had to be organized so as to effect
maximum economies without injuring military strength and its
necessary productive support [23:37,38].
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The Committee went on to make specific recommendations
with regard to the roles of the service secretaries, the
JCS, the incorporation of various committee functions into
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) , and the
establishment of additional Assistant Secretary of Defense
positions.
With respect to the individual service secretaries, the
Rockefeller Committee took a position counter to that of
Forrestal. It stated that there could be no distinction be-
tween military affairs and civilian affairs. Service secre-
taries should have control of their departments in all aspects,
military and civilian alike. The military chief of each
service was to be completely subject to the discretion of
civilian authority; and, except in emergencies, all orders
would always go through the channels of the civilian secretary
[23:39,40]
.
The Joint Chiefs were encouraged by the committee to
rise above the parochial views of their respective services.
The Key West Agreement, which was signed in 194 8 by the ser-
vice chiefs to settle roles and missions disagreements, needed
extensive revision [23:40]. The JCS had been established as
an advisory group and the Committee felt that all vestiges
of the command function needed to be removed.
The Committee also recommended actions which would open
up decision making in the JCS to civilian leaders. The
Secretary of Defense and his principles were encouraged to
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selectively attend JCS deliberations. It recommended that
the JCS provide the President and Secretary of Defense with
the full reasoning behind even its unanimous decisions. The
committee also encouraged the Departments of Defense and
State to cooperate closely on current operational problems,
including full participation by JCS planners. The purpose
of these recommendations was to bring into JCS planning at
all levels a variety of points of view, including those based
on scientific and technical background and knowledge [23:
41,42]
.
The Rockefeller Committee also tacitly recognized the
problems created by military officers who wore two hats:
one as an individual service chief and the other as a member
of the JCS. Their principal responsibility was to the Presi-
dent and to the Secretary of Defense. Their planning and
advisory work as members of the JCS constituted their pri-
mary duty. In this regard, the chiefs were encouraged to
delegate many of their less important duties, including super-
vision of the day-to-day operations of their individual
services [23: 43]
.
"As a general principle, the Committee believes that boards
and agencies should not be set up by statute in the OSD, and
the Secretary of Defense should be left free to adjust the
assignment of staff functions" [23:49]. The committee recom-
mended the abolition of the Munitions Board and the Research
and Development Board. They had previously been eliminated
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as independent institutions by the 1949 Amendments and placed
in the OSD. The Rockefeller Committee's recommendations
would complete this evolution, making these functions a
staff duty under the Secretary.
These new functions would be coordinated by a battery
of new Assistant Secretary positions, increasing the size
and range of the staff of the Secretary of Defense. The
Commission emphasized the staff function of these assistants.
Assistant Secretaries should not be in the direct
line of administrative authority between the
Secretary of Defense and the military departments.
They should assist in policy development, pre-
scribing standards and providing the Secretary
of Defense with information [2 3:50].
In addition to the existing contingent of three Assis-
tant Secretaries of Defense (Comptroller, International Se-
curity Affairs, Manpower and Personnel) , the Committee re-
commended seven more positions at that level. An Assistant
Secretary for Research and Development would replace the old
R&D Board, "which had been hampered in carrying out its func-
tions by the rigidity of its membership and the complicated
administrative mechanism inherent in the board-type structure"
[23:50]. To perform the duties between R&D and the quantity
production of weapons, the Committee proposed an Assistant
Secretary for Applications Engineering. He would make recom-
mendations concerning new developments as to their suitability
for purposes intended, reliability, simplicity, and economy
of production; especially with respect to their suitability
for production by existing machine tools and their ability to
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fit into a complete weapon system [23:51], The Assistant
Secretary for Applications Engineering would head a Weapon
Systems Evaluation Group, which would include military mem-
bers and a staff of outstanding scientists and engineers.
The Group would study present and future weapon systems,
their relations to strategy and tactics, comparative effective-
ness and costs. It would rely for its data on operations re-
search and operations evaluations groups attached to the
three military departments [23:51].
An Assistant Secretary for Supply and Logistics would
be responsible for formulation of overall policy and for the
supervision and review of programs in the fields of procure-
ment, production planning, distribution, transportation, stock-
piling, and warehousing. He would assume many of the func-
tions of the Munitions Board: (1) Appraising the feasibility
of JCS plans in terms of the availability of materials- end
items, components, and supporting services, (2) Developing
systems for production programming, production scheduling,
and expediting, (3) Developing recommendations on require-
ments for materials that should be stockpiled to meet military
needs, and (4) Developing policies and programs for the main-
tenance of industrial facilities required for the production
of military end items and components in the event of ,
mobilization [23:51,52].
The Committee recommended additional Assistant Secretaries
for Properties and Installations, Legislative Affairs,
Health and Medical, and as General Counsel.
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C. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REORGANIZATION OF 1953
In 1953, acting on the recommendations of the Rockefeller
Committee Report, the Congress passed legislation implement-
ing a major Reorganization Plan. It abolished the Munitions
Board, R&D Board, and the Defense Supply Agency. The func-
tions of those institutions were transfered to the staff of
the Secretary of Defense, which was increased by the recom-
mended seven Assistant Secretarial positions (Fig. 2)
.
The Reorganization Plan increased the scope of the office
of Chairman, JCS by giving him the authority to manage the
Joint Staff. The members and Director of the Joint Staff
and their tenures would be subject to the approval of the
Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, JCS [30:638].
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
T
DEP. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
- ASD COMPTROLLER
- ASD INT'L SECURITY AFFAIRS
- ASD MANPOWER & PERSONNEL
- ASD RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT
- ASD APPLICATIONS ENGINEERING
- ASD SUPPLY AND LOGISTICS
-ASD PROPERTIES AND INSTALLATIONS
- ASD LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS
-ASD HEALTH & MEDICAL
- ASD GENERAL COUNSEL
Figure 2. Assistant Secretaries of Defense, 1953
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D. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SECOND HOOVER COMMISSION
The Second Hoover Commission, like the First, studied
the entire spectrum of administration in the federal govern-
ment. Its conclusions, presented in 1955, highlighted mana-
gerial problems, especially in the area of budgeting, which
were applicable to all federal departments and agencies. The
Commission also made some specific recommendations with
reference to thq Department of Defense.
The Hoover Commission reappraised the entire budgeting
process, including those changes implemented by the 19 50
Budget and Accounting Procedures Act. It cited major prob-
lems in both the accounting and budgeting areas.
Performance budgeting, as implemented in 1950, had not
been successful. Congress had continually expressed dissatis-
faction with the program classifications and the accounting
support for them. The Commission found that past expendi-
tures were the driving factor in determining the efficacy
of new requests. The merits of programs themselves were not
reappraised or evaluated each year. Perhaps most importantly,
the Commission found that the Bureau of the Budget made no
use of the performance data. It relied more on the old objects
of expenditure classifications, such as salaries, rents, etc.
[17:52]
.
The Commission recommended that the Bureau of the Budget
be strengthened with increased personnel assets, enabling it
to concentrate on the management aspect of performance
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budgeting. Bureau of the Budget personnel should be placed
in each agency and the Bureau should make an annual review
of all agencies for the President in terms of their programs
and functions. The Hoover Commission made other recommen-
dations to eliminate some of the weaknesses that it had
found in the implementation of performance budgeting. It
recommended a change in programs so that responsibility for
performance could be fixed and variances analyzed. Also the
accumulation of cost accounting data needed to be improved so
that a comparison could be made of the relative economy and
efficiency of similar programs in different agencies [17:53,
54].
Another budgeting problem, cited by the Hoover Commission,
was that the federal budget was founded on estimates of obli-
gations rather than actual costs. Obligations incurred during
the year, however, did not necessarily have any relation to
costs incurred during the year. This system failed to take
into account the inventories and the working capital available
for consumption during the budget year [17:54]. It also
neglected to include materials which had become available out
of prior years obligations. Planned operations could not
be related to past or projected costs. To rectify this situa-
tion, the Hoover Commission recommended accrual accounting.
It advised Congress to change the appropriations structure




To support its recommended budgeting changes, the Com-
mission made many recommendations for improved accounting.
The Commission wanted to change the present allotment system
because it placed emphasis on living within allotments, rather
than the usual management criteria of performance in terms
of cost. It felt that a proper analysis of performance
should include costs to the government, such as depreciation,
rent, interest, taxes, and payroll costs. Ignorance of these
items gave a distorted picture of performance, which often
resulted in good money being thrown after bad [17:55].
The Second Hoover Commission alos made a thorough study
of management operations within the Department of Defense.
According to the Commission, three general problems existed
in the Department of Defense. (1) The Secretary of Defense
lacked effective control over the JCS. (.2) This same lack
of control extended over the operations of the three services.
(3) There was also a general lack of machinery for the con-
duct of business operations [17:199]. The Commission's report
focused on this latter problem area.
Outmoded systems of administration, service tradition and
parochial biases, and static, archaic laws were responsible
for DoD shortcomings in management functions [17:59.]. The
Commission made a variety of recommendations including: (1) an
improved organizational framework for managerial decision-
making, (2) an integrated, common supply and service activity,
(3) an improvement in personnel policies, focusing on increased
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tenure, motivation, and skill for both military and civilian
employees, and (4) an improved financial control system
throughout all levels of the armed services [17:260].
The Commission offered many specific solutions to select
business problems within the Defense Department. It cited
a general lack of knowledge as to what the department owned,
owed, or how it used its resources. The current system put
management emphasis on consuming all of one's funds. This
i
was because the allotments for one year were used as an indi-
cation of the amounts required for succeeding years. The
Committee recommended the development of a strong internal
auditing function to supplement the efforts of GAO [17:62],
Another problem area involved the promotion of economy,
efficiency, and improved service in the transaction of the
public business. The root of this problem was the DoD's
competition with the private sector in various business
enterprises. The Commission identified forty-seven types of
such enterprises, which had long outlived their original
justifications. Their capacity for perpetuation even after
their original purpose had ended was due to Congressional
interests, which resisted termination, and the military per-
ception of such services as compensation. The armed forces
had a score of justifications for such enterprises but none
were defensible from a business perspective. Usually, govern-
ment competition was always unfair competition because the
hidden costs in taxes, capitalization expenses, interest,
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depreciation, and personnel costs were not considered [17:
156]
.
The Committee recommended divestment of the most
abusive enterprises such as commissaries, exchanges, bakeries,
meat cutting plants, and laundry and dry cleaning facilities
[17:160]
.
The coordination of common supply functions under the
existing Defense Department organization was impossible. The
Committee recommended that "Congress should enact legislation
establishing a separate civilian-managed agency, reporting to
the Secretary of Defense, to administer common supply and
service activities" [17:266]. The benefits of such an organi-
zation would be to obviate interservice rivalries, to have
a staff of specialists, and to operate efficiently like a
commercial enterprise. Such an organization would be quickly
expandable in wartime without drastic reorganization, and
would remove commercial-type operations from the military
departments. This would free uniformed personnel for duty
in the line functions.
Changes were also necessary for the overall improvement
of management personnel qualifications. Steps needed to be
taken, which would attract the ablest of administrators as
Presidential appointees. The Committee recommended increasing
salaries and relaxing conflict-of-interest laws. It also
recommended improved career opportunities for specialized
personnel in support activities, including top- job availa-
bility for career civil servants, and civilian opportunity
for advanced training [17:268].
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E. PROVISIONS OF THE 1956 ACCRUAL ACCOUNTING LEGISLATION
In 1956 Congress passed legislation which acted on the
recommendations of the Second Hoover Commission. The purpose
of the legislation was "to approve governmental budgeting
and accounting methods and procedures" [31:781]. The legis-
lation amended the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 to re-
quire that all future requests for appropriations be developed
from cost-based budgets. It amended the Accounting Proce-
dures Act of 1950, requiring each agency head to take the
following actions: (1) develop consistency in accounting and
in budget classifications for performance budgets, (2) achieve
synchronization between accounting, budget classifications
and organizational structure, (3) support future budget
justifications with information on performance and program
costs by organizational units [31:782].
The 1956 Public Law for Accrual Accounting also provided
that each agency head "cause the accounts of each agency to
be maintained on an accrued basis to show the resources,
liabilities, and costs of operations of such agency with a
view to facilitating the preparation of cost-based budgets"
[31:783]
.
F. PROVISIONS OF THE DOD REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1958
In 1958 the Congress enacted legislation "to promote the
national defense by providing for reorganization of the De-
partment of Defense" [32:514]. The specific intent of Congress
was "to provide for the establishment of unified or specified
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commands and clear lines of command for them" [32:514],
Congress also wanted "to eliminate unnecessary duplication
on the DoD, particularly in the field of research and en-
gineering, by vesting its overall direction and control in
the Secretary of Defense" [32:514].
The Congress sought to obtain its objectives by again
strengthening the authority, direction, and control of the
Secretary of Defense. It gave the Secretary full authority
to transfer, reassign, abolish, or consolidate functions in
pursuit of a more effective, efficient, or economical organi-
zation. The Secretary of Defense was given the authority to
assign, to one or more military departments, the development
and operational use of new weapons or weapons systems. He
was also permitted to consolidate supply and service activi-
ties common to more than one military department [32:514,515],
The legislation also clarified the roles and authorities
of the Assistant Secretaries. Their ability to promulgate
directives was limited to only those situations in which spe-
cific authority had been issued in writing. This restriction
was matched by the caveat that full cooperation was expected
from the service secretary staffs [32:516].
The number of individual service Assistant Secretaries
was reduced to three each. The Act also gave the Secretary
of Defense a Director for Research and Engineering. He was
to be the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on
scientific and technical matters and to supervise all research
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and engineering activities in the Department of Defense.
The Secretary of Defense was also given authority to con-
tract in the civilian sector for basic and applied research
and development.
The Reorganization Act instituted changes which affected
the JCS. The Chairman of the JCS was given the authority of
a full, voting member. The Act approached the problems
created by the fact that JCS members were also military ser-
vice chiefs. It encouraged them to delegate their service
chief responsibilities to their Vice Chiefs. Congress was
careful to restrict the JCS from command authority. Unified
combatant commands were made responsible to the President
and to the Secretary of Defense through the JCS. Missions
for such commands were to be assigned to them by the Secre-
tary of Defense with the approval of the President.
G. ASSESSMENT OF MANAGEMENT PROBLEM AREAS DURING 1950S
Throughout the decade of the 1950's, the internal organi-
zation of the military departments remained basically un-
changed from that of WWII. The major legislation, which
altered the structure of the Department of Defense, did not
change the command relationships within military departments.
Even the major independent studies of the decade, both the
Rockefeller and the Second Hoover Commission reports, did not
assail the internal organizations of the military departments
Although all three military departments were involved in
the Korean Conflict during this decade, there was no need
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for the traditional scramble to reorganize. The present
military organization, combat tested in WWII, was capable
of handling this new challenge. The Korean Conflict created
no new internal problems for the military departments; in
fact, it tended to relieve th peacetime pressures. The
general military expansion brought on by the war, eased the
interservice frictions which accompanied budgetary retrenchment.
Improvement in the civilian control pf the military was
one of the major functions of reorganizational legislation
passed in the 1950 's. This was done both by enhancing the
power and authority of the Secretary of Defense and improving
budgetary controls
.
The Rockefeller Committee had recommended that the Secre-
tary of Defense be given free control over his entire staff
by eliminating statutory, independent boards from within the
Department. It also wanted to increase the Secretary's staff
by seven Assistant Secretaries. Both of these recommendations
were instituted by Congress in the Reorganization Act of
1953. Congress further consolidated the power of the Secre-
tary of Defense in 1958. He was given full authority to
alter any existing non-combatant functions as well as staff
relationships in order to better control the operations of
his department. The Secretary was also given full authority
to determine service assignments for the development of new
weapon systems. This function would become very important in
the years to follow, when complex weapon systems would become
the biggest line items on defense budgets.
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The other major management area to which the 1950' s con-
tributed most heavily was that of budgetary controls. Both
major studies of the decade contained many recommendations
for improving financial management in the Department of
Defense. There were also two major legislative efforts deal-
ing solely with budgetary and accounting controls. They
are particularly noteworthy because they focused on insti-
tuting procedures, which had been proved successful in business
operations. In fact, these procedures had already become
generally accepted standards in their fields.
An Assistant Secretary (Comptroller) had been instituted
with the National Security Act Amendments of 1949. From the
inception of the office until 19 59 it was occupied by one
man. W. J. McNeil. He was a strong individual and carried
the responsibilities of the office as far as possible.
McNeil's only major problem was that budget decisions often
had to be made before strategic plans were drawn. The devel-
opment of strategic plans should have always preceeded budge-
tary decisions in support of those plans [7:307].
Although the legislation of the 1950's provided no relief
to this problem, McNeil was aided by several improved account-
ing and budgetary provisions. Acting on recommendations from
both Hoover Commissions, Congress initiated the Budget and
Accounting Procedures Act of 19 50, and the Accrual Accounting
Legislation of 1956. The first provided the Secretary of
Defense and his Comptroller with an internal audit function
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and integrated accounting controls for financial and manage-
ment accounting. The latter piece of legislation implemented
improved cost classifications for performance budgets,
responsibility cost accumulation, and budget projections
developed by accrued cost based information.
The innovations implemented by these Acts were progressive
in that they recognized the need within DoD for accurate
accounting information to support managerial decisions.
Heretofore, the focus of accounting in DoD had been on out-
side reporting requirements. The importance of this step
can not be underestimated because it portends future develop-
ments in cost-effectiveness analysis, which was to become a
controversial issue in the 19 60 's.
Unfortunately, the legislation of the 1950 's is also
notable for what it omitted. The Hoover Commissions had
recommended everything that had been enacted, but also much
more. According to the Second Commission, many additional
innovations were needed in order to put DoD decision-making
on a sound managerial foundation. Ignored were recommenda-
tions by the Commission to measure an activity's performance
in terms of actual costs. Performance continued to be
measured by an organization's ability to consume its alloted
appropriations. Likewise, the very real costs of doing
business, such as depreciation, taxes, capitalization expenses,
and personnel costs continued to be disregarded.
As already indicated, the major improvement within DoD
in the field of procurement was the Secretary of Defense's
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authority over the development of new weapons systems. He
was also given full authority by the Reorganization Act of
1958 to consolidate supply and service activities common to
more than one military department. The provisions for Assis-
tant Secretaries in both Research and Development and Appli-
cations Engineering improved the ability of the Secretary
of Defense to control procurement at the Department level.
One criticism of committee studies, such as the Rocke-
feller Committee, is that "they are as much the accommodation
of a diverse group of men as they are a reasoned explanation
of their agreed views" [7:289]. The consensus approach toward
improving the JCS in the 1950's was to enhance integration
by incrementally increasing the powers of the Chairman and
the structure and functions of the Joint Staff.
During the decade, a latent problem within the JCS began
to manifest itself. In 1950 overall budget projections and
the cut of appropriations for a carrier, were perceived as
a threat by Naval officers. The CNO, Adm. L. A. Denfeld,
tried to bridge the gap between Secretary of Defense Johnson
and the Navy. His position became untenable, however, as
Adm. A. W. Radford became the principal spokesman for the
Navy. Finally, Adm. Denfeld was forced to take sides and
subsequently was fired by the Secretary of Defense [7:247].
This incident forced the Secretary of Defense to realize
that the JCS was an institution, "which would break down before
it could be opened up to operate beyond the bounds of interest
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representative negotiations" [7:247]. The problem stemmed
from the fact that members of the JCS, as individual service
chiefs, were forced to play conflicting roles. Products of
organizations with strong parochial interests, they were
forced to simultaneously administer those organizations and
convene to produce nonpartisan strategy.
Legislation of the 1950's marked a continuation of the
hope by Congress, that marginal changes in the JCS would pro-
duce the integrated policies desired. Congress only tacitly
recognized this problem by encouraging the chiefs to give
primary importance to their JCS duties and by authorizing
a full delegation of service responsibilities to their Vice
Chiefs.
The 1950 's saw an increase in the internal conflict be-
tween military departments over service roles and missions.
Many of the problems were historic in nature and carried
over from the piecemeal, evolutionary changes of WWII.
Although not new, these conflicts were now in a new organiza-
tion, the Department of Defense. As usual, a catalyst for
this renewed conflict was the budgetary retrenchment which
followed each war. The competition for scarce resources only
increased the rate with which the individual services cast
covetous eyes at each other's missions. This would become
an even more important problem since more and more of the




The 19 4 7 National SEcurity Act stipulated only primary
mission functions for each of the services. The Army, Navy,
and Air Force received missions for the conduct of war on
land, sea, and air, respectively. The Navy was permitted
to keep its naval aviation units and Marine Corps. Secon-
dary mission functions could overlap service boundaries but
could never serve as a justification for existence. For
example, support of sea operations, not the need for strategic
bombing capabilities, justified the Naval maintenance of an
air arm. Congress made no other distinctions than this
throughout the decade. Thus each service competed furiously
for scarce resources to complete missions which overlapped
service boundaries.
Joint operations represented another area which was rela-
tively unaltered by legislation of the 19 50 's. Even the
Korean Conflict did not serve as a major catalyst for
improvement. "Joint operations of the Korean War caused no
major disputes among the services for none of them saw Korea
as the kind of war for which it existed to fight" [7:250].
In the Korean Conflict field forces were directed by the JCS
in consultation with the Department of State. The JCS pre-
pared directives for the Commander in Chief, Far East and
cleared them with the State Department daily. The Secretary
of Defense then took them to the President, who met daily
with the Chairman of the JCS. Only occasionally was the NSC
consulted for further approval [7:248].
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The Reorganization Act of 1958 did specify that unified
combatant commands be responsible to the President and to
the Secretary of Defense. Missions were assigned by the
Secretary with the President's approval. The services were
held responsible for maintaining their individual units in-
volved in unified commands and the JCS was restricted from
exercising any command authority.
Another management area with great future importance was
control over research and development. In this area Con-
gress took decisive action. Full control over research and
development within the Department of Defense was vested in
the Office of Secretary of Defense. Although the authority
and staff assets for control of R&D were made available, fine
tuning of the management systems was left to evolve in the
1960 's and the 1970's.
Legislation in the 1950 's, which strengthened the position
of the Secretary of Defense with respect to the individual
services, also created problems of internal control within
the Department. The 1953 Reorganization Act increased the
Secretary's span-of-control from three to ten Assistant Secre-
taries. A major goal of the legislation was to establish
one clear command channel from the Secretary of Defense
through the service secretaries. The success of the system
implemented depended on a delicate balance between line and
staff authorities. This put the Assistance Secretaries in
a particular quandry. How were they to exercise authority in
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their areas of responsibility if they were not permitted
to exercise line authority? Congress made a tentative
attempt to solve this problem in 1958 by allowing the Secre-
tary of Defense to delegate in writing specific line authority
for select Assistant Secretaries.
The reorganizations of the decade saw an expansion of
Assistant Secretarial posts from three in 19 50 to nine by
1959. Four of the posts had clearly limited functions. These
were the Assistant Secretaries for Legislative and Public
Affairs, Health and Medicine, Manpower and Personnel, and
the General Counsel. A Comptroller was given powerful and
flexible tools for financial management. Political, economic,
and foreign relations came under the purview of the Assis-
tant Secretary for International Security Affairs. Super-
vision of material support activities for the services was
shared by two Assistant Secretaries: one for Properties and
Installations and the other for Supply and Logistics [7:304].
The division of the research and development field in
1953 between R&D and Applications Engineering never worked.
Although in private industry production invariably awaits
completion of the development phase, this does not occur in
weapon systems. There is overlap; design and production are
initiated before development is complete. In 1958 both posi-
tions were merged and the new post of Assistant Secretary
for Research and Engineering created (Fig. 3) [7:304].
The integration of foreign and military policy was





PEP. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
- ASD COMPTROLLER
-ASD INT'L SECURITY AFFAIRS
• ASD MANPOWER & PERSONNEL
ASD RESEARCH & ENGINEERING
• ASD SUPPLY & LOGISTICS
-ASD PROPERTIES & INSTALLATIONS
•ASD LEGISLATIVE & PUBLIC AFFAIRS
[
ASD HEALTH & MEDICINE
ASD GENERAL COUNSEL
Figure 3. Assitant Secretaries of Defense, 1958
which fell to disuse under President Truman, was revived by
President Eisenhower. The latter viewed the NSC much
differently.
The NSC is a corporate body, composed of indi-
viduals advising the President in their own right,
rather than as representatives of their respec-
tive departments and agencies . Their function
should be to seek, with their background of experi-
ence, the most statesmanlike solution to the
problems of national security, rather than to
reach solutions which represent merely a compromise
of departmental positions [4:316].
As a result of this Presidential support, the NSC be-
came an important national policy making organ. An elaborate
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system of committees and procedures were developed to better
serve the President.
The changes of the 19 50's were the final serious attempts
to resolve management problems in the Department of Defense
through formal organizational changes. Further improvement
in management policy would focus on changes in management
technique rather than organizational structure. By 1958,
Congress had vested the Secretary of Defense with all of the




V. THE MCNAMARA YEARS
Although organizational power had been centralized in
the Office of Secretary of Defense since 19 58, "it was not
until 19 61 that the full powers of the Secretary of Defense
to run the Department on a unified basis were actually used"
[11:21]. This assessment provides an insight to how the new
administration planned to approach some of the bitter cam-
paign's major issues: reliance on the strategy of massive
retaliation, the so-called "missile gap", and the apparent
overall decline in U.S. military readiness.
Soon after the election, the transition staff for President-
elect Kennedy recommended yet another reorganization of the
Defense Department. The Symington Committee, which consisted
primarily of former DoD officials, had recommended major
changes in the organization of the DoD. However, Kennedy
was reluctant to enter the Congressional fight that these
changes would entail. The President-elect had selected a
strong administrator, Robert S. McNamara, as his Secretary
of Defense. Based on McNamara' s recommendations, President-
elect Kennedy decided that the Defense Department needed
a vigorous management effort, rather than another reorganiza-
tion. This is a watershed in the development of the Depart-
ment of Defense. It marks a change in course from solving
management problems through organizational change, to solving
management problems with improved management techniques.
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This chapter will cover the development of management
policy within the Department of Defense from 1961 to 19 70.
It will discuss the major players, strategy changes, and
management innovations of the period. Finally, the effects
of these changes on the management problems within the
Defense Department will be assessed.
A. THE NEW ADMINISTRATION
The two major players in the development of management
policy during this period were President Kennedy and his
Secretary of Defense. The individual services and many Con-
gressmen would become antagonists with their active resistance
to change; but these two men would shape defense strategy
and management policy for the next two decades.
Upon his election, President Kennedy took a non-partisan
approach to selecting his cabinet. In Treasury, for example,
he wanted someone "who could call a few of those people on
Wall Street by their first names." For Secretary of Defense,
the President-elect wanted a strong executive with broad
administrative experience and capabilities. He chose Robert
S. McNamara. His confidence in McNamara's capabilities is
highlighted by the fact that McNamara was given complete
authority to fill .all staff positions within the Department,
including those of service secretaries.
Throughout his lifetime, Robert S. McNamara has been des-
cribed by even his detractors as a man of powerful intellect.
They credit him with indefatigable energy, incredible
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administrative and analytical skills, and a facility to
assimulate and retain vast amounts of data. Robert F.
Kennedy, an admirer, called him the most dangerous man in
government because he was so persuasive. The President felt
that McNamara was exactly the man to utilize "the full powers
of the Secretary of Defense to run the Department on a uni-
fied basis" [11:21]
.
The direction of the Defense Department during this period
stemmed from two distinct philosophical bases. The first
was President Kennedy's categorical rejection as irrational
the strategy of massive retaliation. Kennedy, whose views
in this regard were shared by Secretary of Defense McNamara,
wanted a force structure that would provide for a "flexible
response." McNamara' s own personal management philosophy was
the other base from which management policy within the Depart-
ment of Defense flowed.
In many aspects the role of a public manager
is similar to that of a private manager. In each
case he may follow one of two alternative courses.
He can act rather as a judge or as a leader. As
the former he waits until subordinates bring him
problems for solution, or alternatives for
choice. In the latter case, he immerses himself
in the operation; leads and stimulates an examina-
tion of the objectives, the problems and the
alternatives. In my own case, and specifically
with regard to the Department of Defense, the
responsible choice seemed clear" [5:32].
While the overall direction of the Department of Defense
would come from McNamara 's personal management philosophy
and the strategy of flexible response, many of the important
management innovations would come from his industry experience.
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McNamara was a Harvard MBA whose specialty was statisti-
cal analysis. During WWII, he had distinguished himself as
an Air Force troubleshooter in the area of logistics controls.
His work was characterized by the application of business
techniques to military problems. After the War, McNamara
entered the service of Ford Motor Company during that entity's
postwar reorganization. Distinguishing himself in the areas
of financial management and statistical control, McNamara rose
through the ranks of the company to become Ford' s first non-
family President in 1960. His major achievement during this
rise was supervising the development of Ford's Falcon, Ameri-
ca's first compact car. Characteristically, he began the
Falcon's development with a detailed analysis of the leading
European, small-car, import. His staff completely dismantled
the import, assessing its cost and Ford's cost to manufacture
each minute part. McNamara left Ford, after only one month
as it president, to become his country's eighth Secretary of
Defense
.
Implementation of the "flexible response" strategy re-
quired a revamping of the entire military force structure
.
In addition to an effective strategic deterent, the conven-
tional forces had to be built up to a level which would pro-
vide the new administration with a wide range of alternative
responses. The new President wanted to be able to respond
to confrontations with force appropriate to the situation.
Capabilities short of general war were needed. Secretary
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of Defense McNamara reviewed the current force structures
and immediately implemented two new management techniques
to aid in reshaping the U.S. defense posture. The first
technique was the implementation of a Planning, Programming,
and Budgeting System (PPBS)
. The new programming function
linked the existing planning and budgeting processes, enabling
the Secretary of Defense to objectively compare different
forces with different missions such as strategic vs. general
purpose forces. The other new technique was the application
of systems analysis at the OSD level. This enabled the Secre-
tary, through independent analysis, to compare competing
claims to the same scarce resources.
B. THE PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, BUDGETING SYSTEM
Charles J. Hitch, McNamara ' s first Comptroller, developed
PPBS and instituted it within the DoD in time for the first
Kennedy Administration budget submission. The purpose of
PPBS was to correct the deficiencies of the old budgeting
system. Prior to 1961, the President would indicate the
general level of defense expenditures, which he felt appro-
priate to the international situation and overall economic
and fiscal policies. The Secretary of Defense would then
determine the allocations to the services.
Each service would then tend to exercise its own
priorities, favoring its own unique missions to
the detriment of joint missions, striving to lay
the groundwork for an increased share of the
budget in future years by concentrating on
alluring new weapon systems, and protecting the
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overall size of its own forces even at the cost
of readiness [11:24].
Budgeting in this manner precipitated a series of weak-
nesses. It provided information useful for day-to-day opera-
tions, but not for national policy making. There was an
inability to look at programs as entities. Historically,
budgeting was unrelated to military strategy. Force planning
or strategy was developed by the uniformed military, while
budgeting was done by civilians in the Department of Defense.
There was also the lack of a central plan—no authoritative
general policy statement from the Secretary of Defense for
the DoD or the services [5:11-21].
The effects of these deficiencies led to widespread dupli-
cation of effort among the services, gross deficiencies in
cost estimates, and no standard of readiness for forces al-
ready in existence. Most importantly, there was a possibility
that critical gaps in the overall defense posture of the
nation could exist undetected.
According to Secretary of Defense McNamara, the financial
management system in the Defense Department had to serve many
purposes. In addition to producing a budget in a form accepta-
ble to Congress, and accounting for funds in the same manner
as appropriated, the system "must also provide data to make
really crucial decisions about the major forces and weapon
systems needed to carry out the principle missions of the
defense establishment" [11:28]. McNamara wanted "all defense
problems approached in a rational, analytical way and resolved
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on the basis of national interest" [5:31]. While he was
certain that he had the legal authority and responsibility
as Secretary of Defense to do this, McNamara felt that the
financial management information system was inadequate.
PPBS was designed to rectify these problems.
According to Mr. Hitch,
the fundamental idea behind PPBS was to replace
decision-making by compromise among the various
institutional, parochial and other vested inter-
ests in the Defense Department with decision-
making based on the explicit criteria of the
national interest in defense programs [5:33].
The main purpose of PPBS was to develop explicit criteria,
openly and thoroughly debated by all interested parties, that
could be used by the Secretary of Defense, the President,
and Congress as measures of the need for and adequacy of
defense programs. Leaders would then be able to examine pro-
posals from a broader perspective than that of the organiza-
tion proposing them. They could choose among real alterna-
tives and ascertain at what point further spending on a given
military program resulted in incremental gains so small that
it was no longer justified [5:33], PPBS would lead to a
greater centralization of major program decision-making
within the Office of Secretary of Defense. This was felt
justified because the great technological complexity of modern
weapons, their enormous cost, and their lengthy period of
development, placed an extraordinary premium on sound choices
for major weapon systems [5:34].
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The second basic objective of PPBS was the need to con-
sider defense needs and costs together. The fundamental
problem of the old budget system was that the inevitable
budget ceilings resulted in prestige items (carriers, divi-
sions, air wings) being retained and unglamorous but essen-
tial support items (ammunition, spare parts, fuel) being cut
[5:35,36]. PPBS would provide decision-makers with the
information necessary to make the real choice which faced
them: not between whether or not to buy a particular system
but how much to buy. "PPBS through its emphasis on the total
cost of a defense program in relationship to need, and its
search for alternatives that yield the greatest military
effectiveness from the resources available, works to enahnce
an awareness of the relevance of cost" [5:38].
A third basic goal of PPBS was the explicit consideration
of alternatives at the top decision-making level. No longer
would the services be able to gain approval for their favored
programs by presenting them in tandem with clearly inferior
alternatives. Only alternatives which were balanced, feasible
solutions to the problem, would reach the top [5:38]. An
inherent advantage to PPBS was that it made the issues under-
standable to political leaders and general managers because
the program structure gave costs for entire programs. PPBS
translated the defense budget from line item inputs to forces
and from forces to outputs, such as targets destroyed or troops
deployed. It translated detailed technical criteria produced
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by experts into broader criteria that would be of more signi-
ficance to political leaders. This would correct the inherent
bias in DoD toward the experts' view [5:39]. It also would
provide Congress with more practical, thorough, and detailed
information upon which to base budgetary decisions [5:40].
Fundamental to the success of PPBS was the active use of
an independent, analytical staff at the top policy-making
levels. This analytical effort would be conducted along
broad mission lines rather than along service lines, inte-
grating weapons, data, and ideas of the services into force
packages [5:42,43].
Another basic idea behind PPBS was that it provided a
plan combining both forces and costs, which projected into
the future the forseeable implications of current decisions.
It formulated a set of official planning assumptions, and a
point of departure in the continuing search for improvement
[5:44]
.
The final major objective of PPBS was that it should pro-
vide a forum for open and explicit analysis. All parties
would have complete access to information, be free to ques-
tion assumptions, and have the opportunity to express their
views. This would inhibit any one group from successfully
manipulating an analysis [5:75,76]. Mr. Hitch summarized
the thought process behind PPBS.
In sum, the fundamental idea behind PPBS was
decision-making based on explicit criteria related
to the national interest in defense programs as
opposed to decision-making by compromise among
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various institutional and parochial interests.
PPBS also emphasized the consideration of real
alternatives, the importance of evaluating needs
and costs togehter, the need for a multi-year
force and financial plan, the regular use of a
staff as an aid to decision-makers at the top
levels, and the importance of making analysis
open and explicit [5:47],
PPBS was not entirely new. The planning function had
traditionally been carried out by the uniformed military,
primarily under the auspices of the JCS . Budgeting had tra-
ditionally been under the purview of the civilian secretaries.
PPBS preserved the advantages of both of these evolutions:
planning in terms of programs based on missions and budgeting
based on line items or resources. The new programming func-
tion was designed to provide a bridge between the planning
and budgeting process, which were both well established by
1960 [11:29].
The initial problem with the programming process was to
sort out all of the myriad of programs and activities of
the defense establishment and regroup them into meaningful
program elements. A program element was an integrated com-
bination of men, equipment, and installations, whose effec-
tiveness could be related to particular national security
objectives. Wherever possible, program elements were to be
measured in physical as well as financial terms. In other
words, input would be related to output, cost to benefit
[11:32]
.
For each program element, the program costs were sub-
divided into development costs, investment costs, and operating
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costs. The programming process cross-referenced force re-
quirements to budget requirements by breaking down each
program's costs to appropriation's line items. Program
elements were then grouped to the major missions of DoD.
The elements in a group or program were either mutually
supportive or close substitutes for each other. The unifying
principle underlying each major program was a common mission
or set of purposes for the elements involved [11:33,34],
Thus, each program element fit into one of ten major
Defense Department programs. They were: strategic forces,
general purpose froces, intelligence and communications, air-
lift and sealift, guard and reserve forces, research and
development, central supply and maintenance, training and
medical services, administration and associated activities,
and support to other nations [5:48]. The advantage of this
system was that for the first time, the cost of one program
element could be directly compared to another. For example,
many differenct forces provide strategic deterrent. PPBS
allowed a direct comparison of the cost effectiveness of an
Air Force bomber wing with a Navy poseidon submarine for a
given level of strategic deterrence. PPBS ensured that each
program element contributed to the mission (s) of a major pro-
gram. Furthermore, it enabled decision-makers to make economi-
cal tradeoffs between different weapon systems, which accom-
plished the same objectives.
PPBS was implemented with the aid of mnay other new





The FYDP was a comprehensive display of each
of the ten major programs along with each of their program
elements. Essentially, the FYDP was a series of force tables,
giving an eight year projection of forces and a five year
projection of costs and manpower, displayed in mission oriented
programs.
When the Secretary of Defense decides to begin engineering
development of a new weapon system, with procurement presumably
to follow, he initiates a stream of expenditures which can
eventually include development, procurement, and operating
and maintenance costs of the completed system. The FYDP
provided the Secretary of Defense with a record of current
costs and projections of future costs [5:48]. The FYDP served
also as a basis for service budget submissions. Major pro-
gram and force issues were thrashed out in the FYDP during an
annual review cycle. The service budget would then price out
the latest update of the FYDP. The budget review could then
focus on financial requirements without rehashing all of the
program issues [5:52]. The budget review could concentrate
on providing greater detail on procurement lists, production
schedules, lead times, prices, status of funds, etc. [11:39].
Another management tool, utilized to aid the implementation
of PPBS, was the Draft Presidential Memorandum (DPM) . Essen-
tially, a DPM was formualted for each major program in the
FYDP. The DPM represented a formalized decision-making process
so that all major defense programs would be considered and
97

analyzed as a whole. The DPM structured the decision making
process so that it kept to the basic issues and reduced the
emotionalism inherent to major defense issues. Furthermore,
each interested party was guaranteed his day in court because
each was forced to respond to every DPM [5:53,54].
The DPM process served many functions. First, it served
as a vehicle for orderly interrogation and debate, while giv-
ing the Secretary of Defense the initiative in reviewing policy
i
and forces. The process served to identify areas of agreement
and disagreement, to isolate by assumptions, and to focus
attention on areas of uncertainty where judgement needed to
be applied. Additionally, the DPM process would provide a
good transition document for the unintiated: each DPM examined
a total functional area for the proper integration of strategy
and forces [5:55].
While the DPM provided a basis for the "big picture" stra-
tegic decisions, other tools were utilized for specific
problem areas. The Development Concept Paper (DCP) was used
to apply the DPM concept to research and development pro-
jects. Its purpose was to examine performance, cost, schedule
estimates, and technological risks on the basis of whether
to start or continue a research and development program.
The DCP would document the reasons and rationale behind each
decision and force each party to concur or object explicitly.
The goal was not to naively plan inventions or completely
accurate cost data; but rather, to counter the tendency to
grossly overestimate expected performance and underestimate
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costs and risks. The DCPs also set cost thresholds at which
the Secretary of Defense would review his decisions [5:58].
Another management tool was the Readiness, Information,
and Control Table. These were used to provide detailed study,
analysis, and supporting documentation for specific management
problems. They were used primarily to support operational
decisions [5:60].
While PPBS did accomplish many of its objectives and did
rectify many of the problems of the foraer budgeting system,
it was not without its own limitations. PPBS could not turn
poor judgment into good judgment. It could not transform
disagreement into agreement. ' Nor could PPBS guarantee leader-
ship, wisdom, initiative, or imagination. These goals and
traits could only be derived from sound decision-making based
on accurate, reasoned, analysis. The second major management
technique, implemented during the McNamara era, was designed
to provide this analysis.
C. SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
Systems analysis was not new to the Department of Defense.
What was new was that this approach would now be used at the
level of Secretary of Defense. McNamara had decided to insti-
tute his own systems analysis staff capability. Once again
his personal, management philosophy served as the basis for
innovation.
I am sure that no significant military problem
will ever be wholly susceptible to purely quanti-
tative analysis. But every piece of the total
problem that can be quantitatively analyzed removes
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one more piece of uncertainty from our process
of making a choice. There are many factors which
cannot be adequately quantified and which there-
fore must be supplemented with judgment seasoned
by experience. Furthermore, experience is
necessary to determine the relevant questions
with which to proceed with any analysis.
I would not, if I could, attempt to substi-
tute analytical techniques for judgment based upon
experience. The very development and use of
those techniques have placed an even greater
premium on that experience and judgment, as
issues have been clarified and basic problems
exposed to dispassionate examination. The better
the factual basis for reflective judgment, the
better the judgment is likely to be. The need
to provide that factual basis is the reason for
emphasizing the analytical technique [5:66].
The Secretary's systems analysis office was given an
explicit charter to review questions of military strategy,
requirements and force structure, using modern techniques of
analysis. It was established to give the Secretary of Defense
an independent staff assistance in reviewing JCS and service
proposals. Primarily, the office reviewed JCS and service
proposals regarding force and weapon systems requirements,
developed alternatives to these proposals, and integrated
data regarding requirements, costs, and effectiveness. Sys-
tems analysis was regarded by practitioners as a management
philosophy in itself, as noted by Alain Enthoven, who pioneered
its use in the DoD.
Systems analysis is a reasoned approach to
highly complicated problems of choice in a context
characterized by much uncertainty; it provides a
way to deal with differing values and judgments;
it looks for alternative ways of doing a job; and
it seeks, by estimating in quantitative terms




McNamara felt that an effective leader reserved the
right to challenge preferred solutions, to be skeptical, to
suggest alternatives, and to demand analysis rather than
assertions [5:88]. For him, there was no such thing as a
purely military decision. The decision on how many divisions
to station in Europe, for example, depended on a number of
extra-military factors. We had to consider the costs as
they related to budgets and the balance of 'payments . Judg-
ments had to be made about sharing defense burdens among our
allies. Additional political and psychological judgments
also had to be made about the effects of various military
force developments on the political behavior of our friends
and enemies [5:82].
While systems analysis was designed to aid decision makers
in these areas, it was not a panacea. Systems analysis did
not provide a detailed equation by which to generate the
"correct" answer. It was merely an aid to judgment by de-
fining issues and alternatives clearly, by providing a full,
accurate, and meaningful summary of as many of the relevant
facts as possible, and providing the probable costs of hedging
against major uncertainties. In an analysis, assumptions
drive conclusions. Systems analysis helped to illuminate
relevant assumptions and their impact on conclusions [5:63,64]
McNamara summed up his need for systems analysis in a
Congressional hearing:
The real issue is one of clarity of understanding
and expression. Take, for example, the statement
•Nuclear power for surface ships offers a major
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increase in effectiveness.' Precisely what does
that mean? Does it mean 10 percent better or
100 percent better? When that sort of question is
asked a frequent answer is, 'It can't be expressed
in numbers.' But it has to be expressed with the
help of numbers. Budgets are expressed in dollars,
and nuclear power costs more than conventional
power. If nuclear power costs, say 33 percent more
for some ship type, all factors considered, then,
no matter what the budget level, the Navy and the
Secretary of Defense have to face the choice of
whether to put the nation's resources into four
conventional or three nuclear ships, or for a
large budget, eight conventional or six nuclear
ships, and therefore whether by 'major increase'
is meant more than 33 percent, about 33 percent,
or less than 33 percent. Because the Secretary of
Defense has to make the decision in these terms,
the statement 'major increase' is not particularly
helpful. It must be replaced by a quantitative
analysis of the performance of various missions,
leading to a conclusion such as 'Nuclear power for
surface ships offers something between X and Y
percent more effectiveness per ship. Therefore,
$1 billion spent on nuclear powered ships will
provide a force somewhere between A and B percent
more or less effective than the same dollars
spent on conventionally powered ships' [16:244,245],
McNamara sought the use of systems analysis at all levels
within the DoD. He particularly advocated its use at his
level. Early in his tenure, McNamara identified several
factors which limited military-sponsored alternatives. There
was a severe inter-service competition for missions. Each
service battled for mobility and tactical air missions. The
Air Force and the Navy actively sought offensive, strategic
missions. Each service tended to neglect or undervalue pro-
grams that supported the missions of other services, or new,
unconventional missions. For example, the Air Force had long
neglected its tactical air capabilities and the Navy had to
be forced to take on the Polaris submarine. Competition was
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not limited to inter-service rivalry. Intra-service compe-
tition existed between specialties of the same service.
Although PPBS was generally accepted on all fronts as
a valuable management tool, the extensive reliance on systems
analysis was subject to widespread, severe criticism. The
main theme of the House Armed Services Committee was that
military leaders were experts and any reduction of their re-
quests meant risking the nation's security [5:1]. Various
Congressmen said: "Cost effectiveness studies put dollars
before national security!" "Cost effectiveness will result
in our going to war with cut-rate, cut-quality, cheapest-
to-buy weapons." "Nothing but the best will do for our boys!"
[11:43]. One Senator criticized that, "There are, unfortunately,
some policy-making civilians in DoD who seem to know the cost
of everything, but the value of nothing" [5:74]. Individual
service chiefs also became vocal: "Experts in a field where
they have no experience, they (systems analysts) propose
strategies based on hope and fears rather than facts and
seasoned judgments" [5:78]. These criticisms were not transi-
tory. Resistance in Congress to systems analysis lasted long
after it had been implemented. In 1968 and again in 1969,
the Chairman of the House Armed Services tried to abolish
the systems analysis office on the grounds that the Secretary
should not have a civilian led staff advising on matters of
strategy and force requirements [5:4].
However, McNamara had the personal and public support
for systems analysis of both Presidents, whom he served.
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He also enjoyed some support within the Congress, notably
from the Senate Armed Services Committee. Perhaps because
of the underlying reality of allocating scarce resources,
systems analysis has remained an integral part of the defense
decision-making process. Some of McNamara's successors have
emphasized the functions more than others, but all have
maintained the capability within their office.
McNamara's systems analysis staff was instrumental in
every major decision that he made concerning weapon systems
during his tenure. Each of the major decisions was contro-
versial, especially when a military-sponsored system was cut
for not meeting the cost effectiveness criteria. Systems
analysis faced many tests during this period. It could claim
a number of successes; however, there were also some notable
failures. In each case, it was systems analysis which enabled
McNamara to first make his own decision; but more importantly,
to enable him to successfully champion his decisions in the
face of dissent from other government officials.
D. ASSESSMENT OF MANAGEMENT PROBLEM AREAS
Despite various problems with a few specific weapons
systems, the McNamara years produced many improvements in
the overall management of the Department of Defense. McNamara
was the first Secretary of Defense to exercise almost complete
control over the military. He believed that information was
power, and carefully constructed a management control system
which provided him with the information necessary to exercise
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his authority fully. McNamara was also the first Defense
Secretary to exploit fully the power of modern management
techniques. PPBS attempted to ensure that force requirements
and programs flowed from strategy and that the Secretary of
Defense had access to the information necessary to make such
decisions. Systems analysis sought to ensure that the infor-
mation he received was accurate. These management tools
enabled the Secretary of Defense to attempt to drive military
policy in the national interest.
McNamara and the two Presidents whom he served, shared a
common vision for the future security of the United States.
They carefully guided the nation from reliance on a strategy
of massive retaliation to a more stable one of flexible response
McNamara ' s leadership and management skill ensured that mili-
tary policy was consistent with this new doctrine. Program
decisions were made to support this strategy. Although he
was responsible for some major failures in procurement deci-
sions, there can be no doubt that his tenure as Secretary of
Defense was marked by a vast increase of civilian control
over the uniformed services.
Budgetary controls, during the McNamara era, were improved
though the use of innovative management techniques, rather
than legislative action as in prior periods. Improvements
were made from within the Department of Defense. PPBS was
successful in achieving many of its major goals. It enabled
the Defense Department to achieve the performance budgeting
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that had been recommended but never achieved in the previous
decade. No longer were military planning and civilian
budgeting completely divorced from each other. When combined
with systems analysis, PPBS permitted a national recognition
of the effects of economics on defense decision making. No
longer would the realities of the budget be met with arbitrary
spending ceilings.
The field of procurement saw the most widespread applica-
tion of modern business techniques, since the innovations of
Forrestal in WWII. The rigorous use of systems analysis at
the highest decision levels improved the weapons systems
'
selection process. As McNamara had stated, the use of sys-
tems analysis did not ensure correct decisions. But it did
provide a rational approach to making procurement decisions
on the basis of their contribution to national security.
Systems analysis explicitly recognized the fact that we
could not buy everything and provided the Secretary of Defense
with the information necessary to make the hard choices.
The McNamara years produced many other improvements in
the field of procurement. McNamara founded the Defense Con-
tract Audit Agency (DCAA) , which applied modern business
contracting techniques to procurement contracts. The Defense
Supply Agency (DSA) consolidated the procurement of common
supply items for all of the services. McNamara' s systems
analysts pioneered the concept of life cycle costs when com-
paring competing weapon systems. McNamara began the trend
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away from "cost plus" contracting which practically encouraged
contractors to have cost overruns. He advocated the use of
a "fixed-price-incentive-fee" concept, which attempted to
provide contractors with an incentive to hold down costs.
Under this arrangement, a target price was negotiated and a
ceiling price was fixed. The contractor received a pro rata
share of any of the savings achieved by completing the project
under the target price. Conversely, he shared the costs
incurred over the target price. The ceiling represented the
maximum government liability. Costs above this ceiling price
were absorbed wholly by the contractor.
Despite these improvements in defense procurement several
problems still existed. In many cases political considera-
tions often inter ferred with sound business judgment. Cost
overruns on some defense projects posed the greatest problems.
Although greatly fueled by inflation, these overruns were
also caused by poor procurement policies. Contractors were
still able to "buy in" to defense contracts with unrealis-
tically low estimates. The Defense Department had a great
deal of difficulty in fostering honest competition during the
initial project definition phase of the procurement cycle.
The most flagrant cases of cost overruns, such as in the C-5A
aircraft, were due to the government's proclivity toward con-
tract changes
.
From 19 60 to 19 69, there were no significant changes to
the organization of the JCS . The JCS formally entered PPBS
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in the planning phase with the submission of the Joint
Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) , which was based on their
own detailed threat analysis [10:21]. The JSOP was the JCS
input to the force requirements compiled in the annual update
of the FYDP.
One of the great problems of the period, from the JCS
point of view, was the constant overriding of their advice
by McNamara [10:22]. They saw this as a significant obstacle
to their influence. Since the members of the JCS were also
the individual service chiefs, the alienation that they felt
toward their civilian leadership often extended throughout
the services.
During the McNamara years, military policy was carefully
integrated into the overall foreign policy of the United States
President Kennedy had made it clear at the beginning of his
term that he intended to be his own Secretary of State. The
close cooperation and commonality of views shared by the Presi-
dent and his Secretary of Defense ensured that military policy
would be designed to support and implement foreign policy.
Under President Kennedy and later President Johnson, the
elaborate Eisenhower NSC structure was dismantled. The NSC
staff, rather than serving the NSC, served the President
directly. President Kennedy did not want consensus policy,
but rather a presentation of options. Special, inter-depart-
mental task forces were used during crisis situations [4:317].
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Under McNamara, the role of Assistant Secretaries of
Defense vis-a-vis the services was expanded. Without any
statutory change, McNamara' s strong leadership was extended
by his assistants over the services. Using PPBS , the Comp-
troller exercised tight fiscal control over each of the ser-
vices throughout the annual budget cycle. McNamara' s Assistant
Secretary for Systems Analysis profoundly influenced decision-
making at the highest level. The systems analysis staff
directly and indirectly drove decision-making throughout
the military establishment. Although some of the results
of systems analysis were clearly beneficial, it created a
schism between civilian and career military personnel.
Before 1970, the Nixon Administration made a few adjust-
ments to the management systems imposed by McNamara under
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. Nixon's Secretary of Defense,
Melvin Laird, wanted to decentralize some of the power and
authority, which McNamara had concentrated in the OSD. He
focused his personal attention on improving the relations
of the Department with Congress and the uniformed military.
These relations had diminished under the more domineering
McNamara. Although he muted their role in Defense Department
decision-making, Laird appreciated the work of the systems
analysis office and maintained its capabilities at the Secre-
tarial level. Laird also made some minor changes to PPBS.
The JCS were now given budgetary guidance from the President
before preparing their input to PPBS.
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President Nixon also returned to a formalized method of
developing policy recommendations [10:23]. The NSC was
revitalized and an elaborate system of policy subcommittees
was developed to provide analytical studies. Although the
NSC became very influential in determining foreign policy
and integrating it with military, it did not mark a complete
swing back to the consensus decision-making of the Eisenhower
years. Nixon made his decisions after NSC meetings, based
on NSC discussions, staff inputs and special studies [4:317].
Thus, the development of the NSC had come full cycle.
It was not the cabinet level, consensus decision-making body
envisioned by Congress upon its creation in 19 47. It was,
however, the highest policy making body for the integration
of foreign and military policy. It could be molded to fit
the personal decision-making tastes of the President whom
it served. The NSC did not ensure that foreign and military
policy were in consonance; but, it provided a forum for
this coordination to take place.
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VI. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE 1970S TO POD MANAGEMENT POLICY
This chapter deals with the development of management
policy within the Department of Defense from 19 70 to the
present. It covers the administrations of Presidents Nixon,
Ford, and Carter. This chapter begins with a discussion of
the findings and recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Defense
Panel Report of 1970. It follows with a summary of the pro-
visions of the 1974 Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act and an assessment of the impact of these provi-
sions on the Defense Department budgeting process. A brief
description of zero-base budgeting, implemented in 19 77, is
then presented. The chapter concludes with an overivew of
the three Carter DoD studies: the Ignatius, Steadman and
Rice Reports
.
A different approach toward the improvement of manage-
ment policy in the Department had been taken in each of the
last three decades. The 1950s focused on improving manage-
ment policy through organizational change. During the McNamara
years change took the form of improved management techniques
and a vigorous utilization of the power centralized in the
Office of Secretary of Defense. The dominant characteristic
of change in the 1970s was the attempt to improve the manage-
ment by focusing on the timing of critical events of the
major systems acquisition process and the budget cycle. The
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impetus for much of this change initiated from the Nixon
Blue Ribbon Defense Panel.
A. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE BLUE RIBBON DEFENSE PANEL REPORT
In July 1969 President Nixon chartered a Blue Ribbon
Defense Panel to study the organization and operation of the
Department of Defense. it was made up of a group of dis-
tinguished citizens. Although two of its members had pre-
vious Defense experience, most were successful academics
and businessmen. The Panel devoted a year to its work and
produced a 213 page report with 113 recommendations. In
all, 92 of the 113 were to be later implemented in whole or
part; however, few of the major recommendations were ever
adopted [13:19,20]. Those recommendations which were later
implemented, were the ones dealing with systems acquisition
management and procurement policy.
In its final report, issued on 1 July 1970, the Blue
Ribbon Defense Panel made findings and recommendations in
four major areas: the organizational structure of the De-
partment, the JCS, the unified and specified command structure,
and the acquisition process.
The Panel criticized the Defense Department for excessive
centralization of decision-making authority at the level of
Secretary of Defense. The Panel reported that the present
structure of the Department inhibited the Secretary's ability
to selectively delegate authority and decentralize management
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while still retaining personal authority over the major
policy issues [2:1].
Another serious organizational problem within the Depart-
ment of Defense concerned the multiple layers of staffs at
different levels, both within the department and within the
OSD. The most important problem with this arrangement was
that differences of opinion on important issues tended to
be submerged or compromised at lower levels within the
department. This prevented the President and the Secretary
of Defense from having the opportunity to consider all viable
options when making major decisions. The numbers and size
of the various staffs were too many and too large. The
Panel concluded that the primary products were excessive
paperwork and coordination, delay, duplication and unnecessary
expense [2:1]
.
Within the Department of Defense, the organization of the
OSD left many important functions unfulfilled. No organi-
zational element in OSD had the capability or the responsi-
bility to objectively make net assessments of U.S. and foreign
military capabilities. No one was charged with the responsi-
bility for long-range planning for the structuring or equipping
of forces, nor was there any formal mechanism to assure ade-
quate coordination among the various elements of the
Department [2:2].
The Panel also found that the functional assignments of
the assistant service secretaries contributed to a wasteful
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duplication of effort between the service department staffs
and those of the service chiefs [2:2].
To rectify these problems, the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel
proposed a major Defense Department reorganization. It
recommended a division of the functions of the Defense Depart-
ment into three major areas, each headed by a Deputy Secre-
tary (see Figure 4) . The Military Operations section would
include operational command, intelligence and communications
functions. Another section would be responsible for the
management of personnel and material resources. The third
section would be in charge of evaluation type functions in-
cluding financial controls, testing of weapons, and analysis
of costs and effectiveness of force structures [2:3]. Each
of the Deputy Secretaries would be served by an array of
Assistant Secretaries.
This arrangement would reduce the span of control of
the Secretary of Defense to three. Bach Deputy Secretary
would have a span of control of five or less.
The Panel recommended a reduction in the number of Assis-
tant Secretaries serving each service secretary to three per
military department. They would serve as a personal staff
to the military department secretary with no formal functional
limitations on their purview [2:6]. Additionally, the service
secretary's staff and the service military staff would be
integrated to eliminate duplication [2:6].
The second major problem area, cited by the Blue Ribbon



























































the JCS could more effectively perform their impor-
tant statutory role as principle military advisors
to the President and the Secretary of Defense if
they were relieved of the necessity of performing
delegated duties in the field of military operations
and service department supervision [2:1].
In effect, the Panel stated that the fact that JCS members
wore two hats precluded them from performing their primary
function satisfactorily.
The Panel recommended that the JCS and their Joint Staff
be completely removed from the operational chain of command
to the unified and specified commands [2:5], The Panel also
recommended a reduction in the size of the Joint Staff.
The organization and administration of unified and speci-
fied commands gave the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel cause for
great concern. A unified command is a command composed of
significant forces from two or more services, e.g., the Euro-
pean Command. A specified command is one which has a broad
continuing functional mission and is usually composed of the
forces of one service. Examples are the Strategic Air Command
or the Military Airlift Command. The Panel charged that the
present organization did not bring about unification of the
armed forces; but instead, just layered service component
headquarters and large headquarters' staffs [2:1].
The Panel recommended a reorganization of many of the
existing specified commands. For example, the Strategic Air
Command, the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, the Con-
tinental Air Defense Command, and the Fleet Ballistic Missile
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Operations would all be combined into a Strategic Command.
Two additional specified commands, the Tactical Command and
the Logistics Command, would be formulated in the same manner.
No commander of these or other specified or unified commands
would be able to serve concurrently as Chief of Staff of a
military service [2:4].
The Panel sought to establish a clear chain of command
extending from the President through the Secretary of Defense,
the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Operations), and the Assis-
tant Secretary of Defense for Operations, to the Unified Com-
mander. The JCS was to be totally eliminated from this chain
of command. A senior military officer with an operations
staff would be placed between the Deputy Secretary of Defense
(Operations) and all Unified Commanders [2:4].
In an effort to improve operational readiness, the Blue
Ribbon Defense Panel recommended an expansion of the authori-
ties of their commanders. Subordinate unit commanders, whose
units came from the individual services, were to be redesig-
nated as Deputies to the commander of the appropriate unified
command. The change was to make it unmistakably clear that
the combatant forces were in the chain of command which ran
exclusively through the Unified Commander and not through
an individual service chief [2:5], However, the military de-
partments were still responsible for administrative and logisti-





The final major problem area with which the Blue Ribbon
Defense Panel concerned itself was that of systems acquisi-
tion management and procurement policy. The Panel had found
that the policies of the Department of Defense had contributed
to serious cost overruns, schedule slippages and performance
deficiencies. Operational test and evaluation had been too
infrequent, poorly designed and executed, and generally
inadequate [2:2].
The Panel recommended that an entirely new development
policy for major systems be formulated. The new policy
should focus on reducing technical risk by stressing hardware
demonstration before full-scale development [2:7]. New policy
should also focus on the development of selected subsystems
independent of the development of major systems. Government
laboratories and contractors should be used in the develop-
ment phase of subsystems. The Panel discouraged continued
reliance on "paper studies" and cited the need for an increased
use of competitive prototypes. Other measures proposed in-
cluded a more flexible contracting approach, trade-offs between
modifications to existing systems and development of new sys-
tems, and better planning early in the development cycle for
subsequent test and evaluation [2:8],
Project managers, who oversee the acquisition of a weapons
system, were found to be generally underqualified by the Panel.
It wanted to create career incentives for those military offi-
cers who wanted to follow this career path. The Panel also
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wanted to strengthen the project managers position vis-a-vis
his industry counterpart by placing the military contracting
officer under the project manager's cognizance [2:8],
The major change in the systems acquisition process,
recommended by the Panel, was to increase the number of deci-
sion points at which the Secretary of Defense would review
progress on a project. The current system required a Secre-
tary of Defense review and decision at only one point in the
cycle. The proposed system would require three Secretary
of Defense decision points (see Figure 5)
.
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Figure 5. Decision Points in the Acquisition Cycle as
Recommended by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel
B. PROVISIONS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET AND IMPOUNDMENT
CONTROL ACT OF 1974
In 1974, growing Congressional dissatisfaction with the
overall budget process resulted in the passage of the
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Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act. The primary
catalyst for this Act was President Nixon's increasing pro-
pensity to not spend funds appropriated by Congress for pro-
grams with which he did not agree. The Act had more far
reaching consequences, however, than simply precluding this
practice.
Congress had long sought to recover some of the budget
initiative that it had lost over the years to the President.
Congress recognized its lack of control over the budget process
and its lack of internal coordination in this area. To
rectify this problem, this legislation established budget
committees in both the House and the Senate. It also estab-
lished the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) , which consisted
of a professional staff of analysts who would perform for
Congress some of the analytical functions that the Office of
Management and Budget Control (OMB) performed for the Presi-
dent. The Congressional Budget Office was not to make budget
recommendations but rather to analyze those made by the adminis-
tration. It would look at budget alternatives and five year
budget predictions
.
Most importantly, this legislation established a new
schedule of budget submission requirements to be met by the
executive branch. The schedule also set deadlines for Con-
gressional action at various decision points in the budget
process. This legislated budget cycle was designed to reduce
the number of late appropriations each year, to block unplanned
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spending and entitlement legislation, to reduce large budget
deficits, and to improve Congressional staff coordination.
This new budget cycle had great impact on budgeting
within the Department of Defense. Since the new budget
cycle changed the beginning of the fiscal year from 1 July
to 1 October, the budget preparation cycle within the DoD,
particularly PPBS, had to be adjusted so that the new dead-
lines could be met. Whole new budget steps were created by
the Act. Congress would now pass two concurrent resolutions
on each budget. The first, in May of each year, would set
budget targets for authorities and outlays. The second con-
current resolution would be issued in September and would
set a ceiling for budget authority and a floor for revenue.
An additional budget for current services had to be submitted
early in the budget cycle. This would project a budget for
the next fiscal year under the assumption that current ser-
vices would be continued without change. Each of these new
evolutions would require detailed input from Defense Depart-
ment budget personnel.
This new budget cycle posed many other potential problems
for the Department of Defense. From the standpoint of the
acquisition project manager, the new requirements of this
tighter budget schedule would place an increased emphasis on
high quality cost estimates over a longer time frame [6:13].
The new Budget committees and the CBO would be making requests
for information from DoD, which could require the kind of
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time and effort for preparation that could overload the
system at a critical point in the budget process. For the
individual services, intense scrutiny by Congress of future
year projections would require that more attention be placed
on the out-year requirements contained in the FYDP [6:20].
The new budget committees, which set overall fiscal policy
for the DoD, increased the administrative burden of the de-
partment. As a result of this new legislation, several of
the older committees could also have been expected to partici-
pate in the budget cycle more vigorously. Both the Senate
and the House of Representatives had Armed Services Committees
They were responsible for approving military programs and
producing authorization legislation. Once a particular pro-
gram was authorized money had to be appropriated for it.
This was a separate process and each house had an appropria-
tions committee, which was responsible for this function.
Differences between the House and Senate versions of the
same authorization or appropriations legislation were settled
in conference committees. All of these committees placed
requirements on DoD for documentation and testimony.
The provisions of the Act regarding impoundment control
and apportionment also affected the Department of Defense.
Appropriations were now carefully apportioned or phased by
Congress, reducing DoD budget flexibility and increasing
Congressional control. The President no longer had the power
to impound funds for programs that he did not want to support.
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He could rescind or defer funds, but each of these with-
holding procedures would eventually require the submission
of detailed justifications to Congress. In either case,
Congress could still direct that the funds be applied as
appropriated.
C. CHANGES TO THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION PROCESS
Beginning in 19 76 a concerted attempt was made to deal
i
with the multitude of problems created by the existing major
system acquisition process in the Defense Department. The
progress made so far in the procurement arena, from Forrestal's
institution of business practices to McNamara's heavy reliance
on systems analysis, had not solved the very basic management
problems encountered: cost overruns, schedule slippage, sys-
tems failures, duplication of efforts, and a general lack of
control over the system.
The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel Report had highlighted many
of these continuing problems. In 1976 and 1977 a series of
executive department directives were issued, which pursued
many of these continuing problems from a fresh perspective.
They attempted to look at the entire acquisitions cycle, de-
fine the decision points in this cycle, establish responsibili-
ties for each of these decision points, and establish formal
procedures for each of the major acquisition functions.
The first document concerning this new approach to acqui-
sition management was Office of Management and Budget Circular
No. A-109, issued 5 April 1976. This was amplified in August
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19 76 by a detailed pamphlet also issued by OMB. In January
of 1917, two revised Defense Department Directives (5000.1
and 5000.2) implemented and amplified the provisions of the
OMB documents for the Department of Defense.
Circular No. A-109 and its amplifying document provided
basic policy with regard to major system acquisitions. Each
agency head in the executive department was made responsible
to ensure that the provisions of the Circular were followed.
According to OMB, management of the acquisition of major sys-
tems included: analysis of agency missions, determination of
mission needs, setting of program objectives, determination
of system requirements, budgeting, funding, research, engineer-
ing, development, test and evaluation, contracting, production,
and program and project control [26:1].
The general policy of the Circular was designed to pro-
mote the effectiveness and efficiency of the process of ac-
quiring major systems. Needs and program objectives were
to be expressed in mission, rather than equipment terms. This
was to encourage innovation and competition in creating,
exploring, and developing alternative system design concepts.
Increased emphasis would be placed on the initial activities
of the acquisition process to allow competitive exploration
of alternative system design concepts in response to mission
needs [26:3], Agencies were instructed to communicate with
Congress early in the process, relating major system acquisi-
tions to agency mission needs. Each major system acquisition
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program was to have a program or project manager. Each
agency was to establish clear lines of authority/ responsi-
bility, and accountability from the program manager to the
agency head. The agency head and/or his designee were re-
quired to review and approve each project at specific deci-
sion points [26:4],
The Circular established specific management objectives
for each agency involved in the system acquisition process.
Each agency had to ensure that each major system: fulfilled
a mission need, operated effectively in its intended environ-
ment, and demonstrated a level of performance and reliability
that justified the allocation of limited resources for its
procurement. Whenever economically beneficial, agencies
were to foster competition between similar or differing system
design concepts throughout the entire acquisition process.
Adequate system test and evaluation were to be conducted by
service agencies, independent of the developer and the user
[26:4]. Each program was to have its own, tailored acquisition
process. The strategy would include: intended use of the
contracting process, scheduling of the process, methods for
obtaining and sustaining competition, methods of projecting
life cycle costs, and the use of warranties [26:5].
Four key decision points were emphasized by the Circular
as requiring agency head approval. The first was initial
identification of a specific mission to be fulfilled by a
major systems acquisition. This was the major change of this
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new system. The agency head was now required to make a
decision at the very beginning of the acquisition cycle. He
would have to focus on the need of a new system to fulfill
a valid agency mission. The next key point was the selection
of competitive system design concepts to be advanced to a
test or demonstration phase. The subsequent commitment of a
system to full-scale development and limited production would
also require agency head approval. The final decision point,
requiring specific review and approval was commitment of a
system to full-scale production and deployment [26:7].
The Circular required that program or project managers be
assigned for each major system acquisition within an agency.
He was to be assigned as soon as a decision was made to ful-
fill a mission by pursuing alternative system design con-
cepts. The project manager needed to have technical skills
commensurate with the type of project and acquisition manage-
ment skills. Agencies were encouraged to grant to the pro-
ject manager a tenure long enough to provide continuity and
personal accountability [26:6].
Department of Defense Directives 5000.1 and 500 0.2 of
18 January 1977 implemented the provisions of 0MB Circular
A-109 within the Defense Department. They amplified the
provisions of A-109 and set up specific procedures, boards,
documentation systems, and policies for managing system
acquisitions in the DoD. One such board was the Defense
Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) , which was an
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advisory board to the Secretary of Defense for the acquisi-
tion of major defense system programs. As noted above, the
focal point of the change was the involvement of the Secre-
tary of Defense in the decision-making process at an earlier
stage in the system acquisition cycle. The individual ser-
vice would not initiate the acquisition process by submitting
a Mission Element Needs Statement (MENS) to the Secretary
of Defense. The MENS would identify the mission area and
document the military need. It would assess the projected
threat through the time frame the capability was required and
identify the existing DoD capability to accomplish the mission,
The MENS would then assess the impact of not acquiring this
capability [25:4].
Figure 6, below, highlights the decision points of the
Secretary of Defense in this acquisition cycle.
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Figure 6. Secretary of Defense Decision Points in
the Acquisition Cycle, 1977.
D. ZERO-BASE BUDGETING
Soon after his election in 1976, President Carter imple-
mented zero-base budgeting (ZBB) at the federal level. The
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impetus behind this move appeared to be fulfillment of a
campaign promise rather than a well orchestrated effort to
improve management policy. Like successful candidates for
President who preceeded him, President Carter campaigned on
the issue of waste, fraud, and abuse in government spending.
Zero-base budgeting was his recommended solution to these
problems
.
ZBB was a system of budget analysis which required each
budgetary unit within the government to identify and justify
each program and every dollar to be spent in its execution.
Detailed decision packages were prepared which identify the
activities to be performed and the costs identified with
various levels of these activities. As decision packages
and rankings were submitted to each successively higher
level of administration they were reranked with all other
decision packages submitted. The level of funding established
for a particular budget period could then be used as a cutoff.
The more important packages, which fall below the level of
funding, were funded; all others were excluded [18:11],
As a systematic budgetary process, ZBB sought to improve
the quality of management information which reached the uni-
tary decision-maker. It enabled the executive to compare
budgeted costs with actual expenditures for all programs in
the organization. ZBB also required that a planning phase
with explicit executive guidance preceeded the budget formula-
tion phase. Although the Planning, Programming, Budgeting
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System (PPBS) established under the Kennedy Administration
placed planning in the proper sequence, this was not the
case in most budgeting systems. Planning and budgeting tended
to go hand-in-hand. Another goal of ZBB was to formalize a
"bottoms-up" budgetary approach. In this way low level
management would be committed to implementing a budget which
they had helped to build. President Carter hoped that ZBB
would aid him in his promise to reorganize the structure of
federal government, since comparison of decision packages
would highlight duplication of effort. This goal was accom-
plished by ZBB in Goergia, he would point out when he dis-
covered that seven agencies were responsible for the education
of deaf children [9:3], The major goal in the implementation
of ZBB at the federal level was a more efficient allocation
of resources. Each level of management would use this syste-
matic technique to prioritize its requests for resources [8:
12] .
Historically, ZBB had met with mixed success. It had
proved particularly useful, however, in organizations where
a unitary decision-maker made final financial management and
program direction decisions [3:9]. Unfortunately, there was
no unitary decision-maker at the federal level who passed
judgment upon thousands of decision packages. In the first
place, the large number of decision packages were unmanageable
In Georgia, there were 11,000 of them. Setting aside four
hours each day for two months, the Governor could average one
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minute on each decision package. Since the DoD budget alone
is 30 times that of the State of Georgia, how could an analy-
sis of the merits of each package be made? There was not even
enough time to read the packages [1:9],
This highlights the structural problem with ZBB implemen-
tation at the federal level. The federal budget process was
a complex operation and depended on the decisions of two
institutions involved in a Constitutionally mandated adversary
process. The complete budget cycle depended on ultimate
agreement between the President and the Congress, both of
whom had different orientations and missions. Each decision
package then had to stand on its merits in a complex process
involving three governmental bodies (President, House, and
Senate) and literally hundreds of decision-makers. In addi-
tion there was a wide variety of program, budget, and appro-
priation responsibilities exercised by various committees
within these bodies, each representing different and often
contrasting political interests [18:9].
ZBB techniques were first employed in the public sector
in the Department of Agriculture in 1961. Under David Bell,
Director of the Budget for the Department, and under a
different name, ZBB proved a dismal failure. Because of
inadequate planning, 180,000 man-hours were consumed in a
six week period generating reams of poorly organized and
largely neglected reports. Only 200,000 dollars worth of
budgetary changes resulted from this effort [31:40].
130

ZBB in its present guise was instituted on the corporate
level by Peter H. Pyhr at Texas Instruments. Some critics
suggest that his reported success with ZBB is nothing less
than fraudulent. Apparently ZBB was only installed in cer-
tain staff and research units, responsible for less than 25
percent of the company's annual expenditures. Judgement that
ZBB was a success was only Mr. Pyhr's and was based on only
one year's experience [1:9].
President Carter's claims of success at the state level
in the public sector were similarly discredited in separate
scholarly studies. Top level management in the State of
Georgia disagreed with Mr. Carter's assessment of ZBB. Of
the 13 Department heads interviewed, only two (15%) indicated
strong support for ZBB. The others expressed dissatisfaction
with the budgeting system. Eleven (85%) of the department
heads felt that there had been no reallocation of financial
resources with ZBB. ZBB's goal of increased involvement of
lower echelons in the budgetary process met with mixes success.
Only 52 percent of the budget analysts interviewed reported
that their seniors became more involved than under the former
incremental system [9:3]. Sixty-eight percent of the analysts
credited ZBB with improving management information but only
7 percent perceived any shifting of financial resources as a
result of the new system [9:6]. Apparently those most familiar
with the Georgia implementation of ZBB felt that the system
did not measure up well against its own goals.
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Another indictment against ZBB was that it had not been
utilized as intended to budget for the best programs consis-
tent with the level of funding. According to ZBB theory,
the level of funding established for a particular budget
period was used as a cutoff. All programs which were above
this level were not funded. During fiscal year 1974 there
was an increase in the level of funds available to the State
of Georgia. Instead of raising the level in the ZBB to
include more of the priority ranked programs, Mr. Carter re-
quested new decision packages from some of his departments.
The following year the reverse situation existed and instead
of lowering the cutoff to eliminate lower priority decision
packages, Mr. Carter had each department submit a new ranking
of decision packages based on a lower level of funding [9:8,9]
Zero-base budgeting has been imposed by Presidential
directive on executive agencies for a period of four years
now. No definitive study has been completed to analyze the
effectiveness of this system. Users differed in their assess-
ments. High level, Presidential appointees, naturally,
supported the system. Those at the lower, operational levels
tended to resist zero-base budgeting. They felt that the
additional work and documentation required by ZBB was not
compensated by budgetary savings. Indeed, many operational
levels merely paid lip-service to ZBB only performing the
reporting requirements.
Zero-base budgeting has received a broad base of support
among users for one of its functions. The ranking system
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used by ZBB has provided users with a better overall view of
the implications of different budget decision options.
Higher level budget personnel have been better able to
understand the prioritizing of programs that were submitted
to them for review. This benefit has proved particularly
useful to political appointees whose familiarity with the
federal budget process was limited by their short tenure.
This ability to help the uninitiated may enable ZBB to sur-
vive a change in administrations.
E. THE CARTER STUDIES
On September 20, 19 77 President Carter requested that the
Secretary of Defense undertake a study of defense organiza-
tion which would focus on three broad organization and manage-
ment issues [13:1]. The first area of study was the overall
organization of the Department of Defense and the relationships
between subdivisions of that organization. This Departmental
Headquarters Study (the Ignatius Study) was completed 1 June
19 78. The second study, the Report on the National Military
Command Structure (the Steadman Study) , was completed in July
1978. This study was concerned with the specified and unified
commands of the United States, their organization, interrela-
tionships, combat readiness, plans, policies and performance.
The final Carter Study concerned resource management. The
Defense Resource Management Study or Rice Report as it became
known, was concerned with PPBS, the defense acquisition process,
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logistics support alternatives, personnel recruiting,
and military health care.
The Ignatius Study focused on the organization of the
Department of Defense, both the Office of Secretary of
Defense and the military departments. Particularly noted
were the relationships between the Secretary of Defense and
the service secretaries. The general recommendation of the
Study was to reduce the degree of centralization of power
in OSD and to better utilize the service departments in the
management of defense functions
.
More specifically, the Ignatius Study recommended that:
(1) the service secretary's authority and responsibility
be more greatly recognized, concurrent with more explicit
accountability, (2) there be established a more precise
delineation of where OSD's responsibilities end and those of
the military department begin, (3) the service secretaries
and chiefs be given more opportunity to participate in policy
making, (4) the Secretary of Defense and service secretaries
become more directly involved in combat and material readi-
ness reporting, and (5) existing staffs be used more flexibly
to remove unnecessary layers of review and approval [13:26].
The Study went on to discuss six alternative approaches
to the organization of the Department of Defense. The options
ran from extreme change to evolutionary improvement. The
first option was a massive decentralization which would sub-
stantially reduce OSD, leaving the military departments
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generally free to manage their affairs under broad OSD policy
guidance [13:33]. The second alternative was the reverse
of the first: a massive centralization, eliminating the
military departments [13:35]. The third proposal was a more
subtle centralization, which would make the military secre-
taries Undersecretaries of Defense. This option would pro-
vide a single level of civilian authority with specific mem-
bers of OSD responsible for the individual services [13:39].
The next option was termed selective integration and was
aimed at reducing the layering of staffs. A full merger of
the service secretary and service chief staffs provided the
fifth option [13:47], The final option, considered by the
Ignatius Study, was continued evolutionary improvement. This
option was endorsed as the one which would provide the most
stability with change [13:49].
The Steadman Report presented a study of the National
Military Command Structure (NMCS) . The Report was divided
into two broad areas. The first addressed the organization
for war-fighting, including command and control of forces
in the field. The second part of the study covered those
aspects of the NMCS which related to policy, planning, and
advice [20:4]
.
After discussing each of the specified and unified com-
mands the Steadman Report offered minor recommendations for
each of them. The Steadman Report then went on to discuss
management of the specified and unified commands, especially
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the roles of the Commanders in Chief (CINCs) and the Chair-
man of the JCS
.
The Steadman Report found that each CINC believed that
he had full operational command over all forces assigned to
him. However, most CINCs had limited power to influence
the capability of the forces assigned to them. The CINCs
forces were trained and equipped by their parent services.
The individual military departments controled the flow of
men, money and material to the CINCs forces. The Steadman
Report recommended the need to have the CINCs more actively
participate in the resource allocation decision process
[20:34] .
According to the Steadman Report, the CINCs needed a
formal military spokesman in Washington. They should con-
tinue to be operationally responsible to the Secretary of
Defense but a single military officer should be responsible
for overseeing and directing the activities of the CINCs.
The Steadman Report recommended that the Chairman of the
JCS perform this function [20:34].
Another area which received considerable attention in
the Steadman Report was the performance of the JCS and the
Joint Staff. The performance of the JCS was found to be
acceptable but extremely limited by the dual roles of its
members [20:49]. The work of the Joint Staff was criticized
because its argumentation and recommendations were usually
negotiated to the extent that they were reduced to the lowest
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common level of assent. The Report stated that consumers
often found formal JCS positions "ponderous in presentation
and wedded to the status quo" [20:52].
The final Carter DoD study was the Rice Report. This
study focused on defense resource management. In particular,
it focused on the resource allocation decision process (PPBS)
,
weapon system acquisition process, logistics support of combat
forces, career mix of enlisted military personnel, and the
military health care system.
The Rice Study proposed to improve PPBS by having a
combined program and budget review, which followed the planning
phase. The goal of this change would be to enhance the oppor-
tunity to focus on major resource questions that could be
authentically zero-based. Once these questions were satis-
factorily settled they would be recorded and allowed to evolve
incrementally without further complete annual revisions. The
combined program and budget review would be managed by a new
Defense Resources Board (DRB) , chaired by the Deputy Secre-
tary of Defense. The time in the annual cycle freed by the
combined program and budget reviews would be used to focus
additional attention on strategic and resource planning.
Hopefully, the program and budget review could be closely
related to the acquisition cycle. The only Rice recommenda-
tion adopted by DoD was the Defense Resources Baord proposal
[18:vii]
.
The Rice Report found no major deficiencies in existing
policies and procedures of the Dod acquisition process [18:x].
137

It made several recommendations for increasing the effec-
tiveness and efficiency of the process. The Rice Report
stressed the need for DoD to exploit the fabrication and
testing of experimental and prototype hardware in examining
alternative system concepts, rather than rely on design
studies and analysis [18:x] . Similarly, the Report supported
field use of a limited production of new systems before
higher rates of production are begun [26:xi] . In general,
the Report recommended operational testing of actual equip-
ment at each decision point in the acquisition cycle, before
approval was given to begin the next phase.
Thus, it can be seen that the focus of managment change
in the 19 70s centered on the major systems acquisition and
budget cycle processes. The major systems acquisition cycle
was altered to involve the Secretary of Defense more fre-
quently and earlier in the decision-making process. The
budget cycle was altered, giving Congress a stronger role
in the budget process. The 1970s demonstrated that further
change in defense management policy would probably involve




The purpose of this chapter is to summarize, and put
into perspective, the major trends in DoD organization and
management policy which have evolved since 1947, and high-
light some of the problems they have created. This discussion
will focus on four key elements within the DoD: the Office
of the Secretary of Defense; the military department head-
quarters; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the unified and
specified command structure.
Since the original legislation authorizing a Secretary
of Defense in 19 47, that office has experienced considerable
growth in size, capabilities and influence. Of special
importance has been the tremendous concentration of power
that has resulted, particularly with regard to control over
the defense resource allocation process . This OSD domination
of the systems acquisition and fiscal processes has been
brought about through organizational as well as managerial
innovations
.
The evolution from an advisory Research and Development
Board in the late 194 O's to an Undersecretary of Defense for
Research and Egnineering in the late 19 70 's, the establish-
ment of a Defense Comptroller in 1949, and the introduction
of an Assistant Secretary of Defense responsible for analysis
and evaluation in the early 1960*s have been just a few exam-
ples of the organizational transformations that have had such
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an important impact on this concentration of power. Mana-
gerially, the standardization of accounting and budgeting
procedures by the Comptroller, the introduction of the Plan-
ning, Programming, and Budgeting System in the 1960's, and
the formalization of the defense major acquisition process
have provided the critical tools needed by the extensive OSD
structure to effect centralized control over the defense
establishment. The question that has been recently debated
is whether or not the level of centralization achieved has
become excessive.
The accumulation of power by the OSD during the past
thirty years must necessarily have been accommodated by a
corresponding loss of power by some entity elsewhere within
the DoD structure. In fact, as has been seen, that power
loss has been felt most acutely at the military service level.
With the exception of the decision by the Eisenhower adminis-
tration in 1953 to place the service secretaries in the opera-
tional chain-of-command, the role and authroity of the
civilian heads of the services have steadily diminished since
the initial amendments to the National Security Act in 1949.
And while this phenomenon has not gone unnoticed (it was
highlighted by both the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel in 19 70
and again by the Steadman Report in 1978) , little if any,
positive action has been taken to address the problem.
The other major source from which power has flowed over




. From a position of exceptional influence
during the 1940 's, responsible for setting military priori-
ties and formulating military budgets, the JCS has experi-
enced considerable turmoil and loss of influence. Much of
the turmoil has resulted from (1) an historic difficulty in
determining just what function the JCS should fulfill; and
(2) difficulty within the JCS itself due to the dual nature
of the responsibilities of its members.
With regard to the former, the key issue has been whether
the JCS should be primarily concerned with the development
of long-range strategic plans, or whether their focus should
be directed towards the day-to-day supervision of the nation's
combat forces. It appears that the course of action that
has evolved has been to simply assign to them both tasks,
regardless of whether or not they are capable of both.
With regard to the latter difficulty, the inability of
the JCS as a corporate body to provide timely and useful ad-
vice to the Secretary of Defense on issues relating to the
allocation of scarce resources to competing alternatives,
especially when those alternatives involve the taking of re-
sources from one service and giving them to another, has for
the most part relegated that body to the role of observer in
the defense resource allocation process. An unfortunate
consequence of this situation has been a rather limited role
for the commanders of the unified and specified commands in
the resource allocation process.
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As has been presented in the body of this paper, the
unified and specified command structure was formally estab-
lished as a result of the 194 7 National Security Act and
evolved out of the command structure of World War II. While
the basic structure has undergone some minor revisions since
its inception in the later 194 O's, it has remained fairly
stable since 195 8. The arrangements settled upon in 1958
assigned to the military services the responsibility for
developing and maintaining the necessary combatant forces.
The unified and specified commands, under the supervision of
the JCS, were assigned the responsibility for planning for
the employment of those forces, and for executing those plans
when directed by competent authority. If the unified com-
manders were to have any significant influence on the develop-
ment of the forces upon which they must depend to execute
their plans, that influence had to be exerted through JCS.
Thus, the influence of the unified commanders on the resource
allocation process was directly related to the level of influ-
ence that the JCS could bring to bear on that process. As
has been demonstrated, that influence has been tenuous at
best.
In conclusion, the defense establishment has evolved
organizationally and managerially over the past thirty years.
While there has been at least three major DoD organizational
studies conducted in the past twenty years, none has produced
any significant changes. Instead, the past twenty years have
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been characterized by a revolution in management techniques
designed apparently to bring about what the organizational
changes of the first ten years could not. It appears, then,
that while the existing management structure in the DoD has
not been totally satisfactory, future efforts at improvement
will most likely result from continued innovation in manage-
ment techniques, and not from dramatic organizational change
The interesting question that remains is whether or not this
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